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ARTICLES 
THE TROUBLE WITH TREATIES: 
IMMIGRATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
ANGELA M. BANKS† 
Human rights activists describe United States deportation 
law and policy as draconian and unjust.  These activists are not 
alone; outrage by everyday people is expressed in response to 
stories like that of Mary Anne Gehris.  Mary Anne Gehris 
immigrated to the United States at eighteen months old and has 
lived in the South ever since.1  She married, had two children, 
one with cerebral palsy, and considered America her home.  At 
the age of twenty-two Mary Anne pulled another women’s hair 
during a fight over a boyfriend.  She was charged with a 
misdemeanor—simple battery.2  On the advice of a public 
defender, she pleaded guilty.3  She was given a one-year sentence 
that was suspended and received one-year probation, which she 
successfully completed.4  Almost a decade later, Mary Anne 
applied to become a United States citizen, and she noted her 
misdemeanor conviction on her application.  One year after 
submitting her citizenship application, Mary Anne received a 
letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.  She 
thought she was finally getting the date of her citizenship 
 
† Assistant Professor, William & Mary School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 
M.Litt. University of Oxford, B.A. Spelman College. For comments, advice, and 
discussion, I am grateful to the participants in the Washington & Lee Faculty 
Workshop, the Immigration Law Teachers Workshop, Lan Cao, Nancy Combs, Deep 
Gulasekaram, Alan Hyde, Linda Malone, and Peter Spiro. I would also like to thank 
the following graduate research fellows for their assistance: Gregory Albert, Sharon 
Cordello, Amanda Ritucci-Chinni, and Carrie Pixler. 
1 Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Ray of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at 
A15; Press Release, Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, Mary Anne Gehris 
Receives a Full Pardon (Mar. 2, 2000), available at http://oldweb.pap.state.ga.us/ 
NewRelea.nsf/0/561F933BDA945727852568D50069908F?OpenDocument. 
2 Stephen Davis, Deported from America, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 22, 2004, at 14, 
15. 
3 Lewis, supra note 1. 
4 Id.; Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, supra note 1. 
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ceremony.5  She was mistaken; the letter informed her that she 
was to be deported.6  By 1999 her simple battery conviction made 
her deportable as an aggravated felon.7  The 1996 immigration 
reforms created new deportation grounds, which included Mary 
Anne’s 1988 hair pulling fight, and made those grounds 
retroactive.8  The fact that Mary Anne’s entire family resided in 
the United States, that she was responsible for caring for a sick 
child, that she knew no other country, and that her simple 
battery conviction was not a deportable offense at the time she 
pleaded guilty could not save her.  Once Mary Anne was found to 
have committed a deportable offense, there was virtually no 
opportunity for her to challenge the deportation decision as a 
violation of her fundamental rights.  
One might ask, where are the courts and the Constitution?  
Why is it that the courts do not invalidate such results on the 
basis of well-established constitutional guarantees such as 
proportionality, family privacy, or protection against ex post facto 
laws that apply to citizens and noncitizens alike?  The primary 
answer to that question resides in the Supreme Court’s plenary 
power doctrine.  This doctrine dictates that “Congress and the 
executive branch have exclusive decision-making authority 
without judicial oversight for constitutionality” when regulating 
immigration.9  The plenary power doctrine rests on the 
assumption that anything related to immigration is a question of 
national sovereignty and foreign affairs.  As a consequence, the 
plenary power doctrine respects the broad authority of the 
legislative and executive branches to regulate immigration.  
Although some monitoring role for the courts has been carved out 
of this doctrine, it is a limited role that focuses on procedural due 
process.10   
 
5 Lewis, supra note 1. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. Mary Anne was subsequently pardoned by the Georgia Board of Pardons 
and Paroles. Immigration and Naturalization Services, the agency then responsible 
for making deportation decisions, then concluded that deportation was no longer 
required. Id. 
8 The relevant acts are the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. 
9 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (2006). 
10 Courts have been known to creatively characterize legal challenges in the 
area of immigration as procedural in order to provide more robust judicial review. 
Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
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The Constitution, however, is not the only source of rights in 
the immigration context.  The United States has ratified human 
rights treaties that seem on their face to provide much needed 
protection to immigrants.  As a consequence, human rights 
activists and international law scholars have called for judges to 
review challenges to deportation decisions in light of these 
treaties.  They do so in the hope that greater judicial enforcement 
of U.S. human rights treaty obligations will create a more robust 
judicial role in monitoring deportation decisions.  In particular, it 
is hoped that recourse to human rights treaties and the 
jurisprudence of human rights bodies interpreting those treaties 
will undermine the strength and legitimacy of the plenary power 
doctrine.  Within the human rights literature, domestic 
enforcement is considered one of the most effective tools for 
ensuring treaty compliance.11  While I generally agree with this 
proposition, in the immigration context, it fails to recognize that 
the very doctrines that would allow U.S. courts to review human 
rights treaty claims are the doctrines that require judicial 
deference to the political actors.  From the beginning of our 
republic through the mid-nineteenth century, the federal 
government used “friendship, commerce, and navigation” treaties 
to regulate immigration.  Part I of the Article examines the 
connection between the Court’s treaty enforcement jurisprudence 
and its deferential stance in immigration cases.  This Part 
demonstrates that a key principle underlying the Court’s treaty 
enforcement doctrines—maintaining flexibility when addressing 
national soveriengty issues—was transferred to the immigration 
context.  From this analysis it becomes evident that the 
 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1628 
(1992). 
11 See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT; LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1087–96 (3d 
ed. 2008); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of 
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 497 (2005) (“[M]uch of international law 
is obeyed primarily because domestic institutions create mechanisms for ensuring 
that a state abides by its international legal commitments whether or not particular 
governmental actors wish it to do so.”); Christof H. Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The 
Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 
HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 483 (2001); Shayana Kadidal, “Federalizing” Immigration Law: 
International Law as a Limitation on Congress’s Power To Legislate in the Field of 
Immigration, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 515–16 (2008);  Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2656–57 (1997); Kenneth 
Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 350–51 (2000). 
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principles of judicial treaty enforcement are unlikely to inhibit 
the plenary power doctrine because they actually informed the 
very development of that doctrine. 
Part II reconceptualizes the relationship between the Court’s 
plenary power doctrine and treaty enforcement jurisprudence as 
developing reinforcing strategies for maintaining American 
flexibility when addressing national sovereignty issues.  More 
particularly, Part II shows that those who believe that treaties 
can provide an effective basis for restricting the United States 
immigration power ignore significant challenges relating both to 
the status of the relevant treaties as well as the Court’s historical 
reluctance to enforce U.S. treaty obligations in the face of 
conflicting or contradictory federal action. 
The very real obstacles that identified in Part II could be 
ameliorated, as discussed at the end of that Part, but that leads 
to the exploration in Part III of perhaps the most formidable 
hurdle to the effective use of treaties to create structures of 
judicial monitoring of immigration decisions: the problems of 
framing and indeterminacy.  “Indeterminacy” refers to the fact 
that the obligations contained in treaties rarely dictate specific 
outcomes.  Rather, the treaty articulates a combination of rules 
and standards that grant State parties and adjudicators varying 
degrees of discretion to determine what constitutes compliance.  
This creates indeterminacy as to the required outcome in cases 
alleging treaty violations.12  Consequently, the frames used by 
decision makers to analyze the treaty claims are more 
determinative than the treaty standards.  Frames are thought 
organizers.  They focus our attention on certain events, their 
causes and consequences, and obscure other events, causes, and 
consequences.  For instance, the deportation decisions of 
European States and international and regional treaty bodies use 
proportionality review to balance an individual’s right to family 
life and the State’s interest in regulating migration.13  They do so 
in large part because proportionality review fits with the 
dominant features of the legal tool kit that these adjudicators 
 
12 It is not my contention that human rights treaties suffer from absolute 
indeterminacy but rather that the use of standards creates a certain amount of 
indeterminacy due to the discretion given to decision makers. I do not have broader 
indeterminacy concerns because I contend that law as an institution provides certain 
constraints on legal decision makers. See infra text accompanying notes 182–94.   
13 Throughout this Article, I use the term “State” to refer to sovereign states and 
the term “state” to refer to the political sub-divisions within the United States. 
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rely upon when applying the rules and standards governing 
individual rights.  A different set of features are dominant within 
the legal tool kit relied upon by U.S. adjudicators, and they 
consequently lead to a different application of similar rules and 
standards.  Thus, because treaty standards are not determinative 
and because the frames used by adjudicators significantly 
influence the outcome of the case, the application of treaty 
standards to the immigration context would have no meaningful 
effect.  Changing the source of law that U.S. judges are analyzing 
will not avoid or minimize the role that frames play.  U.S. 
adjudicators would continue to use the same frames that give 
rise to significant judicial deference and would thereby reach the 
same substantive outcomes.   
This Article therefore concludes that greater judicial 
enforcement of human rights treaties in the United States will 
not enhance judicial monitoring of deportation decisions.  Despite 
the popularity of this approach within the human rights 
literature, its effectiveness within a specific State depends upon 
how treaty compliance is allocated within the State and the 
frames used to analyze the legal questions at issue.  That said, 
treaty body jurisprudence and foreign treaty-based jurisprudence 
can demonstrate alternative uses of the tools within our legal tool 
kit and can thereby encourage Americans to rethink the validity 
and appropriateness of the frames currently utilized.  But 
overestimating the influence of treaty jurisprudence will waste 
resources and blind us to other more efficacious mechanisms for 
enhancing oversight of deportation decisions.   
I. IMMIGRATION, TREATIES, AND DEFERENCE  
There is a great irony in the claim that greater judicial 
enforcement of U.S. human rights obligations will increase 
judicial monitoring of deportation decisions.  The historical use of 
treaties to regulate immigration enabled the U.S. Supreme Court 
to understand immigration as a foreign affairs issue.  
Consequently, the Court applied a key principle underlying its 
treaty enforcement jurisprudence in immigration cases.  This 
principle dictates that the government should have maximum 
flexibility when making foreign affairs decisions, which are 
inherently political.  Maintaining such flexibility in the face of 
treaty breach allegations and claims of constitutional violations 
requires judicial restraint and deference to political decision 
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makers.  This is the essence of the plenary power doctrine.  
Relying on judicial enforcement of human rights treaties to 
increase judicial review of deportation decisions actually 
reinforces the need for judicial restraint and deference.   
A. Regulating Immigration with Treaties 
Historically, treaties have played a significant role in the 
regulation of immigration in the United States, and the use of 
this legal tool has played an important role in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s review of immigration decisions.  Although the Alien Acts 
of 179814 were enacted soon after our nation’s founding, many 
believe that the federal government did little to regulate 
migration until the 1875 Page Act.15  This act prohibited the 
admission of “women for the purposes of prostitution,” 
involuntary Asian laborers, and convicts.16  Yet within this 
seventy-five year time period,  the federal government regulated 
admission to the United States through treaties, specifically 
friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties (“FCN treaties”).17  
Through these treaties, the United States provided for the 
admission and residence of specific noncitizens.  To promote 
foreign commerce, the United States entered into FCN treaties 
that allowed the citizens, subjects, or inhabitants of the foreign 
State to enter and reside in the United States.  Treaty provisions 
such as the following from the FCN treaty with Austria-Hungary 
were common: 
 
14 The Alien Acts of 1798 empowered the President of the United States to 
deport noncitizens who were “dangerous to the welfare of the nation.” THOMAS 
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 160 (2008). These acts were set to expire in 1800. Between 1798 and 1800, 
the President never used his authority under these acts to deport noncitizens. The 
Alien Acts of 1798 were the first federal legislative action regulating migration, but 
Congress passed the first naturalization law in 1790. 
15 See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 161 (“For the next 75 years, the 
federal government did little about the regulation of immigration.”); Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1833, 1894–96 (1993) (discussing state regulation of migration in the late 
eighteenth and early ninteenth centuries). 
16 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, 477 (1875) (repealed 1974) (also 
referred to as the Page Act). 
17 Neuman, supra note 15, at 1894. Within this category, I am including treaties 
that governed each of these three topics. All of the relevant treaties referred to two 
or more of the following terms: amity, friendship, commerce, or navigation. The 
seventy-five year period refers to the time the Alien Friends Act expired in 1800 and 
the enactment of the Page Act. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 14. 
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The inhabitants of their respective States shall mutually have 
liberty to enter the ports, places and rivers of the territories of 
each party, wherever foreign commerce is permitted.  They shall 
be at liberty to sojourn and reside in all parts whatsoever of 
said territories, in order to attend to their commercial 
affairs . . . .18 
 
18 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Austria-Hung., art. I, Aug. 27, 
1829, reprinted in 1 WILLIAM M. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL 
ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
OTHER POWERS 1776–1909, S. DOC. No. 357, at 30 (1910) [hereinafter 1 MALLOY 
TREATIES & CONVENTIONS]; see also Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-
Japan, art. I, Nov. 22, 1894, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, 
supra, at 1028–29; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Congo, art. I, 
Jan. 24, 1891, reprinted 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 328–29; 
Convention of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Serb., art. I, Oct. 14, 1881, reprinted 
in 2 WILLIAM M. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, 
PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
OTHER POWERS 1776–1909, S. DOC. No. 357, at 1613 (1910) [hereinafter 2 MALLOY 
TREATIES & CONVENTIONS]; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, art. I, 
Feb. 26, 1871, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 969–70; 
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Consular Privileges, U.S.-Salvador, art. III, Dec. 6, 
1870, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1551–52; Treaty 
of Friendship Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Nicar., art. II, June 21, 1867, 
reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1279–80; Convention of 
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation and for the Surrender of Fugitive Criminals, 
U.S.-Dom. Rep., art. III, Feb. 8, 1867, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & 
CONVENTIONS, supra, at 403–04; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 
U.S.-Hond., art. II, July 4, 1864, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, 
supra, at 952–53; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Liber., art. II, Oct. 21, 
1862, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1050–51; Treaty 
of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Bol., art. III, May 13, 1858, 
reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 113–14; Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Arg. Rep., arts. I, IX, July 27, 1853, 
reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 20–21, 23; Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Peru, art. II, July 26, 1851, reprinted 
in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1388–89; Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Costa Rica, art. II, July 10, 1851, reprinted in 1 
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 341–42; Convention of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Extradition, U.S.-Switz., art. I, Nov. 25, 1850, reprinted in 2 
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1763–64; Convention of Amity, 
Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Borneo, art. II, June 23, 1850, reprinted in 1 
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 130–31; Treaty of Peace, Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Guat., art. III, Mar. 3, 1849, reprinted in 1 MALLOY 
TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 861–62; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, 
U.S.-Port., art. I, Aug. 26, 1840, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, 
supra, at 1452–53; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Hanover, art. I, May 
20, 1840, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 885–86; 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce, U.S.-Ecuador, art. III, June 
13, 1839, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 421–22; 
Convention of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Sardinia, art. I, Nov. 26, 1838, 
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The United States began entering into these treaties as early as 
1778, and by the time the Supreme Court was asked to review 
the Chinese Exclusion Acts, treaties represented a significant 
form of federal immigration regulation.19  Between 1778 and 
1889, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the first major case 
challenging the federal immigration power, the United States 
had entered into FCN treaties with thirty-seven States.20  Treaty 
partners included States as diverse as Italy, Serbia, Mexico, 
Prussia, Liberia, Japan, and Orange Free State.21 
The United States entered into a similar treaty with China 
in 1868, which became the basis for legal challenges to anti-
Chinese California laws and the federal Chinese Exclusion Acts.  
 
reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1603–04; Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Greece, art. I, Dec. 22, 1837, reprinted in 1 MALLOY 
TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 848–49; Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, 
and Navigation, U.S.-Venez., art. III, Jan. 20, 1836, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES 
& CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1831–32; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-
Russ., art. I, Dec. 18, 1832, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, 
at 1514–15; Convention of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Chile, art. 
III, May 16, 1832, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 171–
72; Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Mex., art. III, Apr. 5, 1831, 
reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1085–86; Treaty of 
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Braz., art. III, Dec. 12, 1828, reprinted in 1 
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 133–34; Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation, U.S.-Prussia, art. I, May 1, 1828, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & 
CONVENTIONS, supra, at 1496; Convention of Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation, U.S.-Den., art. II, Apr. 26, 1826, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & 
CONVENTIONS, supra, at 373–74; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Swed.-Nor., 
art. I, Sept. 4, 1816, reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 
1742–43; Convention of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. I, July 3, 
1815, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra, at 624–25. 
19 In 1778, the United States entered into a treaty of amity and commerce with 
France. See 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 3 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931); see also Neuman, supra note 15, at 1894–96.  
20 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at ix–xxi. 
21 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. I, Nov. 22, 1894, 
reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 1028–29; Treaty 
of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Serbia, art. I, Oct. 14, 1881, reprinted in 2 
MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 1613; Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Extradition, U.S.-Orange Free State, art. I, Dec. 22, 1871, reprinted 
in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 1310; Treaty of Commerce 
and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, art. I, Feb. 26, 1871, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & 
CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 969–70; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-
Liber., art I, Oct. 21, 1862, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra 
note 18, at 1050; Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Mex., art. III, 
Apr. 5, 1831, reprinted in 1 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 
1085–86; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Prussia, art. I, May 1, 1828, 
reprinted in 2 MALLOY TREATIES & CONVENTIONS, supra note 18, at 1496. 
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In 1868 the United States entered into the Burlingame Treaty 
with China,22 which recognized the “inalienable right of man to 
change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage 
of the free migration and emigration of [Chinese] citizens.”23  To 
realize the benefits of migration, the parties agreed that “Chinese 
subjects visiting or residing in the United [sic] shall enjoy the 
same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel 
or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of 
the most favored nation.”24   
Significant Chinese migration began in the mid-nineteenth 
century, which was a time when there was a great need for labor 
in the West due to the California Gold Rush and construction of 
the transcontinental railroad.25  The Burlingame Treaty was 
enacted to facilitate Chinese immigration to meet this need for 
inexpensive labor. 
By the 1870s, however, anti-Chinese sentiment hardened 
when American workers blamed Chinese laborers for taking jobs 
and depressing wages.26  As economic tension increased so did 
concerns regarding assimilation.  As Justice Field noted in Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, “[t]he differences of race added 
greatly to the difficulties of the situation. . . .  It seemed 
impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or to make any 
change in their habits or modes of living.”27  In response to these 
concerns, California began enacting laws limiting the economic 
opportunities available to Chinese laborers.28  When local laws of 
 
22 MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 16. 
23 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 592 (1889). 
24 Id. at 593. 
25 MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 15. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the 
Court noted that “for some years little opposition was made to [Chinese laborers], 
except when they sought to work in the mines, but, as their numbers increased, they 
began to engage in various mechanical pursuits and trades, and thus came in 
competition with our artisans and mechanics, as well as our laborers in the field.” 
130 U.S. at 594. 
26 MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 16. 
27 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595. 
28 For example, San Francisco enacted an ordinance in 1880 regulating the 
location of laundries. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the 
ordinance was only enforced against Chinese individuals operating laundries and as 
such was a violation of Fourteenth Amendment. 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). In 1852, 
California enacted a Foreign Miners License Tax that required noncitizens to have a 
license that cost $3.00 per month. This rate was increased periodically reaching 
$20.00 per month by 1870. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, THE 
CHINESE EXPERIENCE IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA: SOME STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND 
CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO ANTI-CHINESE LEGISLATION AND SUBSEQUENT ACTION 
CP_Banks (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:10 PM 
1228 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1219   
this type were challenged, the federal courts declared them 
unconstitutional or in violation of the Burlingame Treaty.29   
In 1882 Congress took action and enacted the first of several 
Chinese Exclusion Laws.  The 1882 law suspended the entry of 
Chinese laborers for ten years but did not apply to Chinese 
laborers present in the United States as of November 17, 1880 or 
those arriving within ninety days after the passage of the act.30  
To enforce these provisions, Chinese laborers eligible to remain 
in the United States had to obtain a certificate upon their 
departure from the United States that would facilitate their 
return.31  The certificate was evidence of eligibility to be admitted 
to the United States under the terms of the 1882 Chinese 
Exclusion Act.32  Enforcement of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act 
became difficult because individuals were allowed entry into the 
United States based on evidence of prior residence other than the 
government-issued certificate.  Significant concerns regarding 
fraud lead to the enactment of the 1884 Chinese Exclusion Act.  
This act made the government-issued certificate the only valid 
evidence for establishing a Chinese laborer’s eligibility to reenter 
the United States.33  The 1884 revisions were still not deemed 
sufficient to address the concerns of Congress, and in 1888  
 
 
(2006) [hereinafter THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE], available at http://teaching 
resources.atlas.uiuc.edu/chinese_exp/resources/resource_2_4.pdf. In 1855, the state 
adopted “An Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons Who Cannot 
Become Citizens,” and San Francisco introduced a tax of $50.00 per person for any 
individual attempting to dock in California who was not eligible for naturalization. 
Id. At this time, only blacks and whites were eligible to naturalize and become U.S. 
citizens. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 43 
(2006). In 1879, California’s constitution prohibited corporations and municipalities 
from hiring Chinese individuals and it authorized cities to remove Chinese residents 
from the city limits to specific remote areas. THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE, supra.  
29 Each of the acts discussed in note 28 were held unconstitutional. THE 
CHINESE EXPERIENCE, supra note 28. 
30 Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 3, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943) [hereinafter 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act]; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 599. 
31 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, supra note 30, § 4. 
32 Id. 
33 Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (repealed 1943) [hereinafter 1884 
Chinese Exclusion Act]; see also MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 25–26 (noting that it 
was hard to enforce the Chinese Exclusion Act “because it was not clear who was 
exempt as a returning Chinese immigrant who had originally arrived in the United 
States before the effective date of the ten-year moratorium”). See generally RONALD 
TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 
79–131 (1989). 
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Congress enacted another Chinese Exclusion Act, which 
prohibited Chinese laborers from returning to the United States 
even if they had a certificate.34  
It was this last Chinese Exclusion Act that was challenged in 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States.  Immigration scholars and 
students are familiar with the constitutional claims raised in 
Chae Chan Ping, but what is often overlooked is that Chae Chan 
Ping also challenged the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act as a 
violation of the 1880 treaty between the United States and China 
(the “1880 Treaty”), which modified the Burlingame Treaty.35  
Chae Chan Ping had resided in San Francisco, California from 
1875 until June 1887 when he traveled to China.  When he 
departed, he had a certificate that, pursuant to the 1882 and 
1884 Chinese Exclusion Acts, permitted his admission to the 
United States upon his return.36  While Chae Chan Ping was 
away, the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted, which 
prohibited his entry into the United States despite his possession 
of a certificate of identity.  He arrived back in San Francisco on 
October 8, 1888, just seven days after the passage of the 1888 
Chinese Exclusion Act.37   
Chae Chan Ping argued that, pursuant to the Burlingame 
Treaty and the 1880 Treaty, he acquired property and liberty 
rights that enabled him to return, reside, and work in the United 
States and that these rights could not be limited through 
subsequent legislation.38  This argument was based on the 
 
34 Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (repealed 1943) [hereinafter 1888 
Chinese Exclusion Act]. The law provided that “it shall be unlawful for any chinese 
laborer who shall at any time heretofore have been, or who may now or hereafter be, 
a resident within the United States, and who shall have departed, or shall depart, 
therefrom, and shall not have returned before the passage of this act, to return to, or 
remain in, the United States.” Id at 504. 
35 See Treaty Concerning Imigration, U.S.-China, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826 
[hereinafter 1880 Treaty]; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 599–600 
(1889) (“The validity of this act, as already mentioned, is assailed, as being in effect 
an expulsion from the country of Chinese laborers, in violation of existing treaties 
between the United States and the government of China, and of rights vested in 
them under the laws of congress.”). The 1880 Treaty was ratified in 1881. 1880 
Treaty, supra, at 826. The 1880 Treaty allowed the United States to “regulate, limit, 
or suspend” the immigration or residence of Chinese nationals, but the treaty stated 
that the United States could not absolutely prohibit such migration. Id. 
36 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582. 
37 Id. 
38 Brief for Appellant at 18, Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (No. 1446) 
[hereinafter Hoadly & Carter Brief]; Brief for Appellant at 2, Chae Chan Ping, 130 
U.S. 581 (No. 1446) [hereinafter Brown & Riordan Brief]. 
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Court’s prior case law upholding treaty-based property rights 
when they conflicted with state law.39  The Court’s response to 
the treaty-based claims helps to explain the development of the 
plenary power doctrine.40   
Chae Chan Ping encountered an unreceptive court partly 
because he claimed that the federal government, rather than one 
of the states, violated his treaty-based rights.  By the late 1800s, 
the Court was willing to police state action to ensure compliance 
with U.S. treaty obligations, but the Court was not willing to 
place the same restraints on the federal government.  Due to 
concerns about institutional competence, the Court deferred to 
political branch decisionmaking regarding treaty compliance.41 
Chae Chan Ping’s treaty compliance arguments were based 
on the Court’s jurisprudence developed in Ware v. Hylton.42  In 
this case, the Court had to determine whether or not a provision 
in the 1783 Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great 
Britain was superseded by Virginia law.  The peace treaty stated 
that “creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful 
impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of 
all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”43  In 1777, Virginia law 
allowed one to repay British debt with an equivalent amount of 
Virginia paper currency.44  The depreciation of the Virginia 
pound made this an attractive repayment option.45  Five years 
later, Virginia went further by enacting legislation stating that 
“no debt or demand whatsoever, originally due to a subject of 
Great Britain, shall be recoverable in any court in this 
 
39 See infra text accompanying notes 42–59. 
40 See infra text accompanying notes 42–59. 
41 The Court’s understanding of institutional competence with regard to foreign 
affairs was influenced by separation of powers norms articulated in the U.S. 
Constitution. See also infra text accompanying notes 54–56. 
42 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). Chae Chan Ping also argued that the Burlingame 
Treaty and the 1880 Treaty operated as contracts under which he obtained the right 
to return to and reside in the United States. This Article focuses on the role of 
judicial treaty enforcement as an explanation of the plenary power doctrine and for 
evaluating modern claims for greater judicial treaty enforcement in immigration. 
Therefore, the treaty as contract arguments are not examined. 
43 Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 602 (2007) (quoting Definitive 
Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, 8 Stat. 80 (1783)). 
44 Id. (citing An Act for Sequestering British Property (1777), in AT A GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY, BEGUN AND HELD AT THE CAPITOL, IN THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 17 
(Williamsburg, Alexander Purdie 1778)). 
45 Id. 
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commonwealth.”46  This act prevented the United States from 
complying with article IV of the 1783 Treaty of Peace.  A British 
creditor challenged the Virginia laws as a violation of the 1783 
Treaty of Peace and the Supreme Court upheld the treaty rights 
of the creditor.47  Justice Chase, in the main opinion, notes that 
“[i]t is the declared will of the people of the United States that 
every treaty made, by the authority of the United States, shall be 
superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual State.”48   
Ware marks the beginning of the Court’s treaty enforcement 
jurisprudence vis-à-vis state action.49  It is this jurisprudence 
that Chae Chan Ping called upon in discussing Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven.50  This case involved a 
tension between property rights pursuant to New Haven rules 
and the 1783 Treaty of Peace.  Chae Chan Ping’s inclusion of this 
case to support his argument that treaty-based rights cannot be 
divested by Congress failed to appreciate the distinction that the 
Court had made by 1884 between alleged state treaty breaches 
and alleged congressional treaty breaches.  The Head Money 
Cases were decided in 1884, and the Court boldly concluded that, 
when faced with congressional action that allegedly violated U.S. 
treaty obligations, the congressional action will be upheld by the 
judiciary.51  Articulating the last-in-time doctrine, the Court drew 
upon previous circuit court decisions addressing the same issue—
a tension between a congressional act and a previously ratified 
treaty.52  In all of these cases, the courts recognized that treaties 
and federal statutes are on equal footing, so the most recent  
 
 
46 Id. (quoting An Act To Repeal So Much of a Former Act as Suspends the 
Issuing of Executions Upon Certain Judgments Until December, One Thousand 
Seven Hundred and Eighty Three (1782), reprinted in 11 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, 
THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 76 
(Univ. Press of Va. 1969) (1823)). 
47 Id. at 604. 
48 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796). 
49 See Wu, supra note 43, at 584. 
50 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823). 
51 Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597 (1884) (“We are 
of opinion that, so far as the provisions in that act may be found to be in conflict with 
any treaty with a foreign nation, they must prevail in all the judicial courts of this 
country.”). 
52 See id. at 597–98 (citing Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855); 
In re Ah Lung, 18 F. 28 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883); In re Clinton Bridge (The Clinton Bridge 
Case), 5 F. Cas. 1060 (C.C.D. Iowa 1867); Ropes v. Clinch, 20 F. Cas. 1171 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871); Bartram v. Robertson, 15 F. 212 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883)). 
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expression of the sovereign controls.  Just as Congress can repeal 
or amend previously enacted statutes, it can similarly “repeal” or 
modify treaty obligations within the United States.53   
By adopting the last-in-time doctrine, the Court decided that 
Congress has the power to determine the effect of treaties within 
the United States.54  Despite the existence of a treaty obligation, 
the last-in-time doctrine states that Congress can decide that a 
treaty has no legal effect within the United States by enacting 
conflicting legislation.  The Court could have concluded that due 
to the United States’ international legal obligations, Congress 
does not have the authority to enact legislation that would cause 
the United States to abrogate a treaty obligation.55  This is 
essentially the approach the Court took when state legislation 
conflicted with a treaty obligation.  The Court did not take this 
route and instead concluded that Congress has the authority to 
enact conflicting legislation.  The last-in-time doctrine reflects a 
strategy for maintaining flexibility when regulating issues that 
implicate national sovereignty.  Here, Congress, rather than the 
judiciary, is recognized as the entity that ultimately decides 
whether a treaty or conflicting domestic law will have the force of 
law within the United States.56  The plenary power doctrine 
similarly maintains flexibility for the political branches when 
regulating national sovereignty issues.  While the last-in-time 
 
53 Id. at 599 (“[S]o far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign 
nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it 
is subject to such acts as congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or 
repeal.”); see also infra note 98 for a discussion about the different domestic and 
international effects of such congressional action.   
54 This reflects judicial deference to Congress on this issue. See also Wu, supra 
note 43, at 581–82, 608–11. 
55 The general principle within international law, pacta sunt servanda, could 
support such a conclusion based on the idea that only the entity authorized to enter 
into a treaty has the authority to abrogate a treaty obligation. Attempted abrogation 
by any other entity is simply a failure to perform the treaty in good faith. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS § 321. 
56 The executive branch also plays a role here in either signing the congressional 
legislation into law or by signing a new treaty, which requires the advice and 
consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Additionally while the last-in-time 
doctrine prioritizes the most recent legal act, commentators have noted that courts 
rarely enforce later ratified treaties despite being the most recent expression from 
the sovereign. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 422 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1953); 1 WESTEL 
WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 555 
(1st ed. 1910); Wu, supra note 43, at 595–97 (discussing Cook v. United States, 288 
U.S. 102 (1933)). 
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doctrine allows Congress to determine what the governing 
domestic law will be, the plenary power doctrine lets Congress 
and the executive decide how the law will be implemented.  
When individuals raise substantive constitutional challenges to 
immigration law or decisions, the courts provide very minimal 
review due to the deference accorded to the political branches 
pursuant to the plenary power doctrine.   
Chae Chan Ping acknowledged that Congress could prohibit 
the future immigration of Chinese laborers despite the 
Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty but argued that 
Congress could not divest previously granted treaty rights.57  
This is where the property rights cases play a significant role in 
Chae Chan Ping’s arguments.  In a line of cases addressing the 
tension between state property laws and treaty-based property 
rights, courts concluded that as long as property rights were 
acquired pursuant to a valid treaty, the subsequent repeal or 
termination of the treaty does not divest the previously acquired 
property rights.58  In cases like Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel v. Town of New Haven, the Court noted that,  
it would be most mischievous to admit, that the extinguishment 
of the treaty extinguished the right to such estate.  In truth, it 
no more affects such rights, than the repeal of a municipal law 
affects rights acquired under it.  If, for example, a statute of 
descents be repealed, it has never been supposed, that rights of 
property already vested during its existence, were gone by such 
repeal.  Such a construction would overturn the best established 
doctrines of law, and sap the very foundation on which property 
rests.59 
Chae Chan Ping thus argued that even if Congress had the 
power, as articulated in the Head Money Cases, to “repeal” the 
Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty, it could not divest Chae 
Chan Ping of the migration rights he acquired under these 
treaties.  In response to Chae Chan Ping’s treaty-based claims, 
the United States recognized that the 1888 Chinese Exclusion 
Act was inconsistent with the Treaty but stated that this act 
successfully repealed the 1880 Treaty.  Relying on the 1798 
congressional repeal of U.S. treaties with France, the Head 
 
57 Hoadly & Carter Brief, supra note 38, at 17 (citing The Head Money Cases, 
112 U.S. at 598–99). 
58 Id. at 18–19. 
59 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 493–94 (1823). 
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Money Cases and its progeny, the United States argued that 
Congress has the power to repeal treaties because the 
Constitution grants treaties and federal statutes the same 
status—“the supreme Law of the Land.”60  Just as Congress can 
repeal or modify federal statutes, it can do the same with 
treaties.  Invoking the last-in-time rule, the United States argued 
that when faced with an irreconcilable conflict between a treaty 
and a federal statute, the most recent provision will control.61  
Since the Chinese Exclusion Acts post-dated the 1880 Treaty, the 
federal statutes repealed the treaty.62  The United States did not 
directly engage Chae Chan Ping’s argument that Congress 
lacked the power to divest rights previously granted by treaty 
even after such treaty is repealed or terminated.  Rather, the 
United States focused on the power of Congress to repeal a treaty 
through subsequent legislation and characterized the treaty 
provisions regarding migration as extending privileges that can 
be taken away.63  The United States’ arguments prevailed. 
Treaties also formed the basis for the claims in Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, which decided the scope of the State’s 
power to deport noncitizens.64  This case challenged the 1892 
Chinese Exclusion Act, which extended the 1888 Chinese 
Exclusion Act for an additional ten years and required all 
Chinese laborers within the United States to obtain a certificate 
of residence.65  Failure to have a certificate of residence was 
 
60 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
61 But see Wu, supra note 43, at 596 (noting that the Court has only once held 
that a more recent treaty controls pursuant to this rule; in all other instances, this 
rule is used to enforce a more recent federal statute). 
62 Brief for the United States at 10–11, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581 (1889) (No. 1446) [hereinafter U.S. Chae Chan Ping Brief]. 
63 The United States argued that 
the reply is that he held his exceptional privileges only by virtue of the laws 
which then existed, but which have since been repealed; and as there is no 
law extending to him those privileges, the privileges died with the law. The 
law gave him the privilege, and the repeal of the law has taken it away; 
and he has no rights greater than any other non-resident of the same class. 
Id. at 14. Similar arguments were presented in the brief submitted by the State of 
California. Brief by Counsel Appointed by the State of California in Support of the 
Contention of the United States at 1–2, Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (No. 1446) 
[hereinafter California Chae Chan Ping Brief]. This brief forcefully presents the 
treaty migration provisions as the grant of privileges rather than rights. As 
privileges, they are “not of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice.” Id. at 2. 
64 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
65 Act of May 5, 1882, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943) [hereinafter 1892 
Chinese Exclusion Act]. 
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grounds for deportation.66  The regulations promulgated by the 
Secretary of the Treasury stated that in order to obtain a 
certificate of residence, a Chinese laborer must provide an 
affidavit “of at least one credible witness of good character” 
attesting to the Chinese laborer’s residence and lawful status 
within the United States.67  If a Chinese laborer was found 
without the required certificate, the individual would have the 
opportunity to prove to the satisfaction of the court and “by at 
least one credible white witness, that he was a resident of the 
United States at the time of the passage of this act.”68  If these 
requirements were met, a certificate of residence would be 
issued.69 
Fong Yue Ting arose after three Chinese laborers were 
arrested and detained for failure to have the required certificate 
of residence.  One petitioner was denied the certificate because 
he was unable to produce a credible witness to attest his 
residence and lawful status.70  The only witnesses the petitioner 
could produce were Chinese, and the collector of internal 
revenue—the officer issuing the certificates—concluded that 
these witnesses were not credible.71  The collector required the 
petitioner to “produce a witness other than a Chinaman,” which 
the petitioner was unable to do because “there was no person 
other than one of the Chinese race who knew and could 
truthfully swear that he was lawfully within the United States 
on May 5, 1892, and then entitled to remain” in the United 
States.72   
The petitioners in this case not only argued that they were 
arrested and detained without due process of law in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment but also that the Chinese Exclusion Acts 
violated the Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty.73  The 
Burlingame Treaty not only granted Chinese laborers lawful 
residence in the United States,74 but it ensured that they would 
 
66 Id. § 6. 
67 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 701 n.2. 
68 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act, supra note 65, § 6. 
69 Id. 
70 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 703. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 703–04. 
73 Brief for Appellants at 5–6, Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (Nos. 1345, 1346, 
1347) [hereinafter Choate & Evarts Brief]. 
74 Id. at 12. The treaty “recognized [Chinese nationals’] inalienable right to 
change their allegiance and residence and to come and settle [in the United States], 
CP_Banks (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:10 PM 
1236 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1219   
be granted the same rights as United States citizens.  The 1880 
Treaty provided that Chinese laborers would have the same 
“rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions” that were 
granted to the citizens of the most favored nation.75  At the time 
that this treaty was ratified, the United States granted the 
citizens of Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium the right to 
enter and reside in the United States and “the same rights in 
respect to their property, commerce, trade, and industry, and to 
receive the same protection and security for their persons and 
property as the native-born inhabitants or other citizens of the 
United States.”76  Petitioners therefore argued that pursuant to 
these treaties, Chinese laborers were entitled to the same right 
to reside in the United States as United States citizens.77  Since 
citizens are protected from deportation, Chinese laborers residing 
in the United States pursuant to the Burlingame Treaty were 
similarly protected from deportation.78  Thus section 6 of the 
1892 Chinese Exclusion Act, which provided for the deportation 
of Chinese laborers who could not establish by “at least one 
credible white witness” that he was a United States resident at 
the time the act was enacted, violated the Burlingame Treaty 
and the 1880 Treaty.   
By the mid-1800s, the Court began to recognize immigration 
regulation as a federal prerogative and started to limit the ability 
of states to regulate admission through substantive restrictions 
or taxes.79  When the Court came to review the Chinese Exclusion 
Acts, it not only understood immigration regulation to be a 
federal power, but it understood that treaties were the 
mechanism by which that power was exercised.  This connection 
 
and the Treaty of 1880 finding them so here guaranteed their right to remain here, 
and as to those then here, at any rate guaranteed them against any future 
legislation for their removal.” Id. 
75 Id. at 7 (quoting 1880 Treaty, supra note 35, art. II) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“Chinese laborers who are now in the United States shall be allowed to go 
and come of their own free will and accord, and shall be accorded all the rights, 
privileges, immunities, and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and 
subjects of the most favored nation.” (quoting 1880 Treaty, supra note 35, art. II) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
76 Brief for the Appellants at 28–29, Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (Nos. 1345, 
1346, 1347) (emphasis removed) [hereinafter Ashton Brief]. 
77 Choate & Evarts Brief, supra note 73, at 12. 
78 Id. 
79 See Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 300–01, 305 (1849); 
see also Neuman, supra note 15, at 1848. 
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between treaties and federal immigration regulation was 
significant in the development of the plenary power doctrine.  
The use of treaties to regulate immigration reinforced the idea 
that immigration is a foreign affairs matter.  This shaped the 
Court’s framing decisions, which influenced the scope of available 
judicial review.  As a foreign affairs issue, Congress and the 
executive are entitled to judicial deference when immigration 
decisions are reviewed.  This reflects the Court’s concerns about 
separation of powers and institutional competence.  Similar 
concerns led the Court to conclude that treaty compliance 
decisions are political decisions left to the executive and 
Congress.80  Any decision to exercise robust judicial review of 
substantive constitutional challenges to immigration decisions 
would create an end run around the treaty enforcement 
doctrines.  Congress would no longer have the final say as to 
what the law is regulating immigration or how it would be 
implemented—the judiciary would.  To maintain maximum 
flexibility for international political decisionmaking, the Court 
would need to defer to congressional and executive immigration 
decisions.  Yet judicial deference when faced with allegations of 
unconstitutional action undermines rather than reinforces the 
checks and balances provided by our separation of powers 
system.81 
By challenging the validity of the Chinese Exclusion Acts 
based on the Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty, the Court 
was asked to decide whether or not the United States was in 
compliance with its treaty obligations.  This is a task that the 
Court historically has shied away from when congressional action 
was the basis for the alleged treaty breach.  Despite this 
jurisprudential backdrop, Fong Yue Ting argued that the 
Burlingame Treaty and the 1880 Treaty granted him, and 
similarly situated Chinese laborers, the right to continued 
residence in the United States and that Congress had not 
repealed these treaty rights with the 1892 Chinese Exclusion 
Act.82  Unlike Chae Chan Ping, Fong Yue Ting did not argue that 
 
80 See supra text accompanying notes 54–56. 
81 The Court has never indicated that the political branches are free to ignore or 
disobey the Constitution. Rather, based on their obligation to uphold and defend the 
Constitution, the Court seems to contend that it can rely on these branches to act in 
accordance with the Constitution without judicial oversight. 
82 Ashton Brief, supra note 76, at 28–30; Choate & Evarts Brief, supra note 73, 
at 5–6, 12. 
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Congress could not divest an individual of treaty-granted rights; 
rather he argued that Congress had not done so.  Recognizing the 
last-in-time rule, the petitioners argued that Congress did not 
intend to abrogate or repeal the Burlingame Treaty with the 
enactment of the 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act.  Rather, this act 
was an explicit effort by Congress to protect the Burlingame 
Treaty rights of Chinese laborers.83  The Court ruled against the 
Chinese petitioners, concluding that the 1892 Chinese Exclusion 
Act, as the last expression of the sovereign, controlled rather 
than the Burlingame Treaty or the 1880 Treaty.84 
Together Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting make two 
important points for judicial review of immigration decisions.  
First, these cases reinforce the Court’s conclusion from the mid-
1800s that immigration regulation is a federal prerogative.85  
Second, they remind us that Congress has the authority to repeal 
prior treaty obligations.  When the Court came to review the 
Chinese Exclusion Acts, it understood that treaties were the 
mechanism by which the immigration power was exercised.  
Thus, the principles underlying the Court’s treaty enforcement 
jurisprudence were influential in the development of the plenary 
power doctrine.86  In Chae Chan Ping, Justice Field 
acknowledged that the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act contravened 
the 1880 Treaty but concluded that this did not invalidate the 
1882 statute.87  Justice Field turned to standard norms and rules 
regarding treaty compliance in determining the validity of the 
 
83 Ashton Brief, supra note 76, at 30–32. The petitioners argued that there were 
two classes of Chinese laborers residing in the United States at the time these cases 
were heard. There were those that settled in the United States based on “the 
invitation held out to them by the Burlingame Treaty,” and then there were those 
who entered in contravention of the Chinese Exclusion Acts. Choate & Evarts Brief, 
supra note 73, at 7–8; see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 750–51 
(1893) (describing the strategies used by Chinese migrants to evade the first time 
entry restrictions of the Chinese Exclusion Acts). With regard to the lawful Chinese 
migrants, the petitioners argued that “[t]he act does not purport to take away any 
rights of the laborers who came lawfully into the country under the treaties with 
China and the Restriction Acts, by abrogating or repealing those treaties or those 
laws, but explicitly assumes that they are rightfully here, intends that they may 
remain, and proposes to legislate in regard to them as a part of the lawful population 
of the United States.” Ashton Brief, supra note 76, at 31. 
84 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 720–21. 
85 See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849); Neuman, supra note 15, at 1848. 
86 The plenary power doctrine dictates that “Congress and the executive branch 
have exclusive decision-making authority without judicial oversight for 
constitutionality” when regulating immigration. MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 27. 
87 See In re Ah Lung, 18 F. 28, 32 (1883). 
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1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.88  Based on the last-in-time rule, the 
Court concluded that the 1882 act was the controlling expression 
of the sovereign.89  The fact that this legislative act constituted a 
breach of the Burlingame Treaty did not factor into the Court’s 
analysis.  The Court’s analysis in Fong Yue Ting similarly 
applied the last-in-time doctrine.90 
The Court’s analysis in Chae Chan Ping focused on whether  
Congress had the authority to enact the 1882 Chinese Exclusion 
Act.  One aspect of this analysis was whether Congress could 
enact legislation that contravened U.S. treaty obligations.91  
Justice Field applied the prevailing norms and rules regarding 
the relationship between treaties and federal statutes—treaties 
and federal statutes are on equal footing and the last-in-time will 
control.92  He noted that  
treaties were of no greater legal obligation than the act of 
congress.  By the constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof, 
and treaties made under the authority of the United States, are 
both declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no 
paramount authority is given to one over the other.  A treaty, it 
is true, is in its nature a contract between nations, and is often 
merely promissory in its character, requiring legislation to carry 
its stipulations into effect.  Such legislation will be open to 
future repeal or amendment.  If the treaty operates by its own 
force, and relates to a subject within the power of congress, it 
can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a  
 
legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of 
 
88 See id. at 29–30. 
89 See id. at 30. In this case, the Circuit Court for the District of California was 
faced with a challenge from an individual born in Hong Kong who claimed 
exemption from the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. At the time that the petitioner was 
born in Hong Kong, it was under British control. Petitioner argued that as a British 
subject, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act should not apply to him. Id. at 29. The court 
concluded that the act was meant to cover all individuals who because of their “race, 
language, and color” are Chinese. Id. at 29, 31. Justice Field went on to reference the 
last-in-time rule, stating that “[w]hether a treaty has been violated by our 
legislation, so as to be the proper occasion of complaint by the foreign government, is 
not a judicial question. To the courts it is simply the case of conflicting laws, the last 
modifying or superseding the earlier.” Id. at 30.  
90 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720–21 (1893). 
91 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). 
92 Id. 
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congress.  In either case the last expression of the sovereign will 
must control.93  
Quoting the Head Money Cases, the Court stated “so far as a 
treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can 
become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this 
country, it is subject to such acts as congress may pass for its 
enforcement, modification, or repeal.”94   
The Court has sought to maintain maximum flexibility for 
the United States when conducting foreign affairs.  According to 
the Court, States have a sovereign right to breach treaty 
obligations, but breaches have consequences.  A breaching State 
may be subject to countermeasures or liable for damages.95  A 
State’s decision to open itself up to such liability is a political 
decision that courts should not second guess.  The Court’s treaty 
enforcement jurisprudence reflects the Court’s unwillingness to 
enter this political quagmire.96  Treaty enforcement is a task that 
is shared by the judiciary and the political branches of 
government.  Vis-à-vis the states, courts are responsible for 
ensuring that state action does not cause the United States to 
breach a treaty obligation.  Yet the judiciary does not have the 
same responsibility vis-à-vis Congress or the executive branch 
because the Constitution explicitly grants these entities 
authority to regulate foreign affairs, foreign commerce, and 
national security.  Due to this understanding of institutional 
competences, the Court has deferred to the political branches 
when faced with treaty-based challenges to federal law.  
Deference in this context created the last-in-time rule, which 
states that when there is a conflict between federal law and a 
treaty provision, the most recent provision will control.97   
This Article contends that the plenary power doctrine 
extends this approach to judicial review to constitutional 
 
93 Id. The circuit court opinion in this case focuses heavily on the treaty claims 
and reaches the same conclusion. Judge Sawyer quotes extensively from In re Ah 
Lung and the Head Money Cases to conclude that Congress has the authority to 
“legislate in such manner as to control and repeal stipulations of treaties granting 
this latter class of rights.” In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431, 434–35 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 
1888). 
94 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600 (quoting Edye v. Robertson (The Head 
Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)). 
95 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 362–66 (2007). 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 54–56. 
97 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (1987). But see 
Wu, supra note 43, at 596. 
CP_Banks (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:10 PM 
2010] THE TROUBLE WITH TREATIES 1241 
challenges.  This doctrine reflects the Court’s desire to defer to 
Congress when faced with treaty-based claims and to defer to 
Congress and the executive when faced with substantive 
constitutional claims.  Invalidating the relevant Chinese 
Exclusion Acts based on substantive constitutional challenges 
would have limited the State’s flexibility within the international 
context.  In light of this broader concern, it would have been 
surprising for the Court to defer to Congress when faced with 
treaty-based claims but not when faced with constitutional 
claims.  The plenary power doctrine, like the last-in-time 
doctrine, seeks to maintain maximum political flexibility in areas 
related to foreign affairs.  This Article’s claim that treaty 
enforcement doctrines have influenced and shaped the 
development of the plenary power doctrine is developed further 
in the next Section. 
B. The Plenary Power Doctrine: Extending Treaty Enforcement 
Doctrines 
The Court’s desire to maintain flexibility for the government 
to make international political decisions stems from the Court’s 
conclusion that treaty compliance decisions are political decisions 
rather than legal decisions.  The President is responsible for 
carrying out treaty obligations pursuant to the foreign affairs 
power and Congress determines how, or if, a treaty will be 
enforced within the United States through the enactment of 
implementing legislation.98  As early as 1798, Congress took 
 
98 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
206, 210–12 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1996) (1972); see Wu, supra note 43, at 
587. This reflects the process for non-self-executing treaties. As the Court held in 
Medellín v. Texas, non-self-executing treaties that lack implementing legislation are 
not binding in domestic courts and the President cannot make them so through an 
executive order. 552 U.S. 491, 530 (2008). In 2004, the International Court of Justice 
held that the United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
and as such, fifty-one named Mexican nationals were entitled to review and 
reconsideration of their state court convictions and sentences. Id. at 497–98 
(discussing the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31)). To abide by this international obligation, President Bush 
issued a memorandum to the Attorney General stating that “the United States 
would ‘discharge its international obligations’ under Avena ‘by having State courts 
give effect to the decision.’ ” Id. at 498. The Court concluded that the President’s 
memo sought to make law, which is a power explicitly granted to Congress in the 
Constitution. Id. at 527. The Court did not, however, foreclose other means by which 
the President can seek to comply with treaty obligations. Id. at 530. The Court 
stated that “[n]one of this is to say, however, that the combination of a non-self-
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action to alter the international legal obligations of the United 
States.  That year, Congress declared that treaties with France 
were “no longer obligatory on the United States.”99  After 
specifying the ways in which France had breached the treaties, 
failing to compensate the United States for its injuries and 
refusing to negotiate a response for the breaches, Congress 
declared that the treaties were no longer “legally obligatory on 
the government or citizens of the United States.”100  The Court 
recognized Congress’s power to alter international legal 
obligations in 1884, holding that treaties are “subject to such acts 
as congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or 
repeal.”101  To modify or repeal an international obligation, 
 
executing treaty and the lack of implementing legislation precludes the President 
from acting to comply with an international treaty obligation.” Id. The President is 
only precluded from “unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.” Id. 
The President is free to “comply with the treaty’s obligations by some other means, 
so long as they are consistent with the Constitution.” Id. 
 Congress is responsible for enacting implementing legislation. An inconsistency 
between federal statutes and a treaty reflects a congressional choice and such 
choices will have international political or legal consequences. Any of these actions 
can implicate foreign affairs, which is an area that the political branches have 
unique authority and competence in. Any breach of the international obligations, 
despite compliance with the implementing legislation, can authorize an injured 
party to undertake countermeasures or pursue a legal claim before an international 
adjudicatory body. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra, at 211. This is true even if the U.S. law 
in question is the implementing legislation. To the extent the implementing 
legislation conflicts with the treaty or does not comply in some other fashion, the 
United States will be internationally liable for a breach absent an acceptable 
defense. Legislative pronouncements “repealing” a treaty do not alter the 
international obligations of the United States. Id. at 211–14. Historically, arguments 
have been made that this power is held jointly by the President and Congress or the 
President and the Senate. Id. at 211. The issue was addressed in Goldwater v. 
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), when Senator Barry Goldwater challenged President 
Carter’s termination of the 1955 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan without 
senatorial or congressional approval. HENKIN, supra, at 213. The Supreme Court 
declared the issue a nonjusticiable political question “because it involves the 
authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations.” 
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Absent action by the 
President, the United States remains bound by its treaty obligations internationally. 
Any congressional “repeal” is only effective with regard to governing domestic law. 
99 Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578 (1798). 
100 Id. 
101 Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).  
By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like 
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument 
to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either 
over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will 
always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be 
done without violating the language of either; but, if the two are 
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Congress must express its intent to do so very clearly.  Mere 
inconsistency is not sufficient for the Court to conclude that 
Congress has modified or repealed a U.S. treaty obligation.102   
Since Marbury v. Madison, however, courts review 
congressional action for compliance and compatibility with the 
U.S. Constitution.  This is understood to be an essential 
mechanism for protecting the separation of powers outlined in 
the U.S. Constitution.  Ensuring that U.S. action is compatible 
with U.S. treaty obligations is similarly necessary for protecting 
the constitutional separation of powers scheme.103  The Court, 
however, has been reluctant to exercise the judicial power in 
contexts involving foreign affairs or other political matters.  This 
reluctance is based on the idea that the institutional competences 
of the executive and legislative branches better suit them to 
resolving such disputes.  This separation of powers concern is 
reflected in numerous judicial self-restraint doctrines, such as 
the political question doctrine, the last-in-time rule, and the 
plenary power doctrine.104  
Regulating treaty compliance vis-à-vis Congress is an area in 
which the courts have decided that Congress is better equipped 
to ascertain the consequences of breaching a treaty, and the 
judiciary should respect such a decision because of the foreign 
affairs implications.  If the sovereign has decided that it is in its 
best interests to breach a treaty obligation, then the injured 
party must seek relief through diplomatic channels or 
international adjudicatory bodies.  It is not, however, for 
domestic courts to provide such relief.  The provision of relief by 
U.S. courts would minimize the ability of the United States to 
take action deemed politically necessary and to speak with one 
voice internationally. 
In light of the international political implications 
surrounding treaty obligations, courts have been reluctant to 
 
inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other: provided, always, 
the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing. 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
102 See, e.g., United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 
1464–65 (1988). 
103 U.S. treaty obligations are the supreme law of the land along with the U.S. 
Constitution and federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
104 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 262 (1962); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 54–56. 
CP_Banks (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:10 PM 
1244 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1219   
enforce treaty obligations in the face of conflicting federal law.105  
As long as Congress acts within its constitutional power, courts 
have upheld its actions, “even if they violate treaty obligations or 
other international law.”106  In Taylor v. Morton, Justice Curtis of 
the Circuit Court of Massachusetts refused to determine if the 
1842 Tariff Act violated the 1832 Friendship and Commerce 
Treaty between the United States and Russia.107  The treaty 
provided that Russia would have most favored nation status for 
tariffs.  This ensured that the tariffs for Russian imports would 
be the lowest tariff granted by the United States.  The 1842 
Tariff Act set the tariff for hemp from Manilla, Suera, and India 
at $25 per ton and all other hemp at $40 per ton.108  Justice 
Curtis recognized that states have the power to “refuse to execute 
a treaty,” but the power to do so in the United States rests with 
Congress.109  He concluded that it was not within the judicial 
power to determine  
whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign ha[d] been 
violated . . . ; whether the consideration of a particular 
stipulation in a treaty, ha[ving] been voluntarily withdrawn by 
one party, [was] no longer obligatory on the other; [and] 
whether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign, manifested 
through his representative [gave] just occasion to the political 
departments of our government to withhold the execution of a 
promise contained in a treaty, or to act in direct contravention 
of such promise.110 
Our courts have concluded that these are matters for the 
political branches of government because they implicate  
 
 
 
 
diplomacy and law making.111  As such, the judiciary should defer 
 
105 HENKIN, supra note 98, at 214 (“Courts do not sit in judgment on the political 
branches to prevent them from terminating or breaching a treaty.”). 
106 Id.; see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706–08 (1893); 
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
107 23 F. Cas. 784, 788 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855). 
108 Id. at 784–85. 
109 Id. at 786. 
110 Id. at 787. 
111 Id.  
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to the political decisions regarding treaty compliance rather than 
enforcing treaty obligations domestically.112 
The plenary power doctrine reflects the same concerns that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has with regard to treaty compliance—
flexibility in foreign affairs.  The Court has treated immigration 
as a foreign affairs matter not only because it deals with the 
citizens of other States but because historically the federal 
government regulated immigration with treaties.  At the time 
that the federal immigration power cases were decided, 
friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties granted the 
citizens of the contracting State the right to enter and reside in 
the United States.113  The use of treaties to regulate immigration 
created a context in which the Court would be deferential to the 
political branches of government.  The Court’s treaty 
enforcement jurisprudence mandated deference to the executive 
and Congress in the face of treaty breach allegations.  The 
plenary power doctrine extended that approach to constitutional 
challenges.  Just as the Court deferred to congressional decisions 
to legislate contrary to treaty obligations, the Court would 
similarly defer to congressional and executive decisions that 
allegedly violated the U.S. Constitution in the area of 
immigration.114  The Court’s deference in the treaty context is 
based on the idea that treaty compliance decisions are political 
decisions rather than legal decisions.  Since the U.S. Constitution 
grants the executive branch and Congress the power to make 
such political decisions, courts should not review these decisions 
in hindsight.  Immigration decisions are similarly seen as 
political rather than legal because they implicate foreign affairs, 
 
112 Id. at 786 (“To refuse to execute a treaty . . . is a matter of utmost gravity and 
delicacy; but the power to do so, is prerogative, of which no nation can be deprived, 
without deeply affecting its independence.”). 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 17–19. 
114 The early constitutional challenges of the Chinese Exclusion Laws claimed 
that Congress did not have the authority to enact the laws and that executive 
officials violated the Fifth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs by enforcing the laws. 
In response to these claims, which have not been the focus of my discussion, the 
Court articulated the contours of the plenary power doctrine: “Congress and the 
executive branch have exclusive decision-making authority without judicial 
oversight for constitutionality.” MOTOMURA, supra note 9, at 27; see also Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 706–08 (1893). In Chae Chan Ping, the Court stated that the immigration 
decisions of the political branches were “conclusive upon the judiciary.” 130 U.S. at 
606. 
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as demonstrated by the use of treaties to regulate.  In both 
contexts, treaty-based claims and substantive constitutional 
claims, the Court did not want to limit the power or flexibility of 
the United States when making international political decisions.   
In the treaty enforcement context, the Court created 
doctrines that reinforced the power of the political branches to 
make political decisions even when those decisions conflicted 
with existing treaty obligations.115  In the substantive 
constitutional context, the Court took a different but related 
route to protect flexibility in foreign affairs.  Rather than stating 
that these actors have the authority to regulate immigration in 
ways that contradict the U.S. Constitution, the Court decided 
that it would provide minimal judicial review of substantive 
constitutional challenges.  Judicial deference in this context gives 
the executive branch and Congress space to make the necessary 
political decisions, but it does not absolve them of their obligation 
to uphold and defend the Constitution.116   
Despite these different strategies for maintaining flexibility 
in foreign affairs, the Court’s treaty compliance jurisprudence 
created a context in which the plenary power doctrine was 
required.  In the nineteenth century, immigration was regulated 
with treaties and was therefore understood to be a political 
foreign affairs matter.  The Court’s treaty compliance 
jurisprudence put treaties and federal statutes on equal footing, 
thus empowering Congress to pass later in time statutes altering 
treaty obligations.  When the government’s immigration 
decisions were challenged as treaty violations, the last-in-time 
doctrine insulated the government’s decisions.  Because our 
courts view immigration decisions as political foreign affairs 
decisions, the same insulation was needed when immigration 
decisions were challenged as violating the U.S. Constitution.  The 
plenary power doctrine provides that insulation by limiting the 
review that courts will provide.   
 
115 See supra text accompanying notes 54–56, 93–112. 
116 See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002). The Court assumes 
that Congress and the executive branch will regulate immigration in a manner that 
is consistent with the Constitution. 
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II. THE LIMITS TO PROTECTING IMMIGRANTS’ HUMAN RIGHTS  
The plenary power doctrine has persisted despite the 
decreasing use of treaties to regulate immigration.  While the 
legal tools used to regulate immigration have changed from 
treaties to federal statutes, the perception of immigration as a 
national sovereignty issue that implicates foreign affairs has 
endured.  Human rights scholars therefore seek greater judicial 
enforcement of U.S. human rights treaty obligations as a tool to 
bolster the judiciary’s role in monitoring deportation decisions.  
Human rights treaties, and more specifically the jurisprudence of 
treaty bodies, are seen as tools for undermining the veracity of 
the plenary power doctrine.  This claim ignores three significant 
challenges: the status of the relevant human rights treaties, the 
application of treaty enforcement doctrines, and the 
indeterminacy of human rights treaties.  The combination of 
these factors prevents human rights treaties from providing an 
effective check on the United States’ power to deport noncitizens.  
This Part contends that bringing treaties back into immigration 
reinforces the need for judicial deference to political decision 
makers.   
Common law judges around the world have utilized non-self-
executing treaties and treaties that have been signed but not 
ratified to confirm interpretations of domestic law, to resolve 
statutory ambiguities, and as a source for constitutional 
interpretation.117  This trend has motivated legal scholars and 
advocates in the United States to seek greater judicial 
recognition and enforcement of U.S. treaty obligations as a tool 
for constraining the State’s power to deport noncitizens.118  
 
117 See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward 
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 635–
36, 653–54, 660, 679–80 (2007). 
118 Kadidal, supra note 11; Roth, surpa note 11; see also STEINER, ALSTON & 
GOODMAN, supra note 11; Hathaway, supra note 11; Louis Henkin, The Constitution 
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 853, 863–64 (1987); Heyns & Viljoen, supra note 11; James A. R. 
Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 804, 805 (1983); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 
WIS. L. REV. 965, 1022. Henkin and Nafziger analyze the classic international legal 
texts to conclude that the power to regulate immigration is not absolute. See Henkin, 
supra, at 863–64; Nafziger, supra, at 806–23. Neither scholar relies exclusively on 
the development of human rights legal norms and rules. Rather these scholars argue 
that the Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that the power to exclude and deport 
is absolute. See Henkin, supra, at 863–64; Nafziger, supra, at 823. While the 
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Within the United States, the use of non-self-executing treaties 
without implementing legislation has been limited to confirming 
interpretations of domestic law.  Even this limited use of such 
treaties has been rejected in immigration jurisprudence.  
Professor Waters has shown that common-law judges use a 
variety of interpretive incorporation techniques to give human 
rights treaties domestic legal effect absent implementing 
legislation.119  Referring to this development as creeping monism, 
Professor Waters identifies five interpretive incorporation 
techniques that range from gilding the domestic lily to a 
constitutional Charming Betsy canon.120  Gilding the domestic lily 
refers to judges using non-self-executing human rights treaties to 
provide additional support for the court’s interpretation of a 
domestic legal text.121  Use of a constitutional Charming Betsy 
canon refers to a much more ambitious use of non-self-executing 
treaties.  Through this technique, judges construe domestic 
constitutional provisions to conform to international human 
rights law.122  Human rights treaties are treated as authoritative 
and binding sources for interpreting domestic constitutions.  
Professor Waters examined the practices of high courts in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States in 
addition to the British Privy Council in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean.  Of the five techniques identified, Waters notes that 
the only technique utilized by the United States Supreme Court 
is gilding the domestic lily.  The Supreme Court’s use of this 
technique has been limited to constitutional interpretation.  
Gilding the domestic lily has not been used by the Court to 
interpret domestic statutes or develop the common law.123  In 
cases like Roper v. Simmons, Lawrence v. Texas, and Grutter v.  
 
 
 
 
regulation of immigration may be an inherent aspect of State sovereignty, 
international legal norms and rules place limits on this sovereign power. 
119 Waters, supra note 117. 
120 Id. at 653. The five techniques include gilding the domestic lily, developing a 
rights-conscious Charming Betsy canon for statutory interpretation or updating the 
common law, engaging in “contextual” constitutional interpretation, and developing 
a constitutional Charming Betsy canon. Id. 
121 Id. at 654. 
122 Id. at 679. 
123 Id. at 655. 
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Bollinger, Supreme Court justices referenced international law to 
bolster the conclusions they reached based on domestic legal 
sources and traditions.124   
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution prohibit the 
juvenile death penalty.125  In determining whether or not a 
punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, the Court 
evaluates evolving standards of decency to determine whether or 
not a punishment is so disproportionate that it is cruel and 
unusual.126  Justice Kennedy cited human rights treaties such as 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (“CRC”) “as evidence of an international consensus 
prohibiting the juvenile death penalty.”127  Yet he also noted that 
the international consensus “while not controlling our outcome, 
does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.”128  This sentiment was even shared by Justice 
O’Connor, who dissented in Roper because she concluded that no 
American consensus against the juvenile death penalty existed.  
Nonetheless, she agreed that “the existence of an international 
consensus . . . can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a 
consonant and genuine American consensus.”129 
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court held that the University of 
Michigan’s affirmative action program did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.  In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg 
utilized international law to bolster the Court’s conclusion that 
affirmative action “must have a logical end point.”130  She 
discussed the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
 
124 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
576–77 (2003) (discussing foreign case law rather than treaty obligations or treaty 
jurisprudence to support conclusions regarding the scope of liberty); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
125 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
126 See Corinna Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA 
L. REV. 365 (2009); Corinna Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1 (2007). 
127 Waters, supra note 117, at 658. Scholars, however, debate whether Justice 
Kennedy used international law to play a confirmatory role or used it determine 
what the legal standard should be.  
128 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
129 Id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor acknowledged this role 
that international law can play in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence but concluded 
that no domestic consensus existed regarding the juvenile death penalty and “the 
recent emergence of an otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic fact.” Id. 
130 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to 
illustrate the international understanding of affirmative action.  
Both of these treaties indicate that affirmative action measures 
should be discontinued when the goals of equal opportunity and 
treatment have been achieved.131  In Lawrence v. Texas, rather 
than referencing specific treaties, Justice Kennedy cited 
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) to 
support his conclusion that liberty protects the “right of 
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.”132  
He noted that many other countries rejected the values 
articulated in Bowers v. Hardwick, and that this right to “engage 
in intimate, consensual conduct . . . has been accepted as an 
integral part of human freedom in many other countries.”133  In 
each of these cases, the Court turned to treaties and treaty 
jurisprudence to reinforce its analysis regarding the scope of 
constitutional protection.  Yet in the Court’s immigration cases, 
these strategies have not been utilized. 
Noncitizens have not been successful challenging deportation 
decisions based on human rights treaties.  Courts have 
responded to human rights treaty-based arguments by 
concluding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review the 
claim, that the deportation decision does not violate the treaty, or 
that the last-in-time doctrine decides the matter.  Most of the 
treaty-based claims raise one of two arguments based on the 
ICCPR.  The first claim is that deporting the noncitizen will 
violate their right to family life under article 17 of the ICCPR.  
The second claim is that ineligibility for cancellation of removal 
based on an aggravated felony conviction before the enactment of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) violates article 13 of the 
ICCPR.  Article 13 states that noncitizens facing deportation 
 
131 Id. (citing The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, art. 1(4), opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, art. 4(1), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13). 
132 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003). 
133 Id. at 576–77. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
Georgia’s sodomy law and held that the constitutional right to privacy did not 
protect consensual homosexual sexual conduct. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled 
by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
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must be “allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and 
to have his case reviewed by . . . the competent authority.”134  
Similar claims based on the CRC and the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights have also been raised.135   
When courts deny the claims based on jurisdiction, one of 
two justifications is offered.  Courts find that either the treaty 
cannot be enforced in U.S. courts because it is a non-self-
executing treaty or the treaty does not create a private right of 
action.136  For example, in Beshli v. Department of Homeland 
Security, the petitioner challenged his deportation as a violation 
of his right to family life under the ICCPR.137  The court did not 
reach the merits of Beshli’s claim.  It concluded that the ICCPR 
could not be enforced in U.S. courts because it is not a self-
executing treaty and because Congress has not enacted 
implementing legislation.138   
In other cases, courts assume jurisdiction for the sake of 
argument and conclude that the deportation decision does not 
contravene the treaty.  For example, in Fernandez v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Services, the petitioner argued 
that deporting him would arbitrarily interfere with his right to 
family life protected by article 17 of the ICCPR.139  The court 
concluded that international law did not prohibit Fernandez’s 
deportation simply because he had family members residing in 
the United States.140  The ICCPR may require a “compassionate 
hearing,” but Fernandez had a hearing in which he could 
challenge the deportation.141   
 
 
134 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(2), adopted Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, art. 13 [hereinafter ICCPR].  
135 See Naoum v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526–27 (N.D. 
Ohio 2004) (CRC); Fernandez v. INS, No. 03-CV-2623, 2004 WL 951491, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (CRC). 
136 See Naoum, 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, for a case in which the court concludes that 
the relevant treaty does not create a private right of action.  
137 272 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
138 Id. at 526. 
139 No. 03 CV 2623, 2004 WL 951491, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2004). 
140 Id. at *3. 
141 Id. In this case, the court initially decided that it did not have jurisdiction to 
review the treaty-based claims because the CRC had not been ratified by the United 
States and the ICCPR was a non-self-executing treaty. Id. The court’s discussion of 
the merits of Fernandez’s ICCPR claim is based on the assumption of jurisdiction for 
the sake of argument. Id.  
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The third way in which these cases are addressed is by 
applying the last-in-time doctrine.  In cases like El Zoul v. 
Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services, Guaylupo-Moya v. 
Gonzales, and Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, the courts apply the last-
in-time doctrine to ICCPR claims.142  In each of these cases, 
petitioners challenged the retroactivity of IIRIRA provisions that 
limited access to discretionary relief from deportation for 
aggravated felons.  The petitioners claimed that the 
unavailability of discretionary relief constituted a violation of the 
ICCPR right to family life.  The court concluded that because the 
United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 and enacted IIRIRA in 
1996, IIRIRA “displaces any obligation assumed by the United 
States as a 1992 signatory to the ICCPR.”143  Congress’s intent 
regarding the retroactivity of IIRIRA is clear, and as such, it 
displaces inconsistent prior treaty obligations.144   
In some cases, courts combine approaches finding no 
jurisdiction but also noting that if the court had jurisdiction there 
would be no violation.  As in Fernandez, the court in Naoum v. 
Attorney General of the United States145 provided both of these 
analyses.  The court started by concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the ICCPR-based claims because this treaty 
does not create a private right of action, and as a non-self-
executing treaty without implementing legislation it is not 
enforceable in U.S. courts.146  The court then went on to conclude 
that the deportation in the case violated neither the ICCPR nor 
the CRC because the petitioner had been allowed to submit his 
reasons against the deportation.  While the immigration judge 
considered the length of his residence and the citizenship of his 
wife and children, he concluded that these factors were 
outweighed by “significant and serious negative factors.”147   
 
142 El Zoul v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 04-4349, 2006 
WL 526091 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2006); Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 
2005); Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598 (M.D. Pa. 2000). 
143 Taveras-Lopez, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 609; see also Guaylupo-Moya, 423 F.3d at 
124–25, 135–36. 
144 Guaylupo-Moya, 423 F.3d at 129, 135–36; see also Taveras-Lopez, 127 F. 
Supp. 2d at 609 (“[T]he congressional declaration controls and Taveras-Lopez may 
not rely upon treaty or customary international law as the predicate for a 
discretionary waiver from removal.”). 
145 300 F. Supp. 2d 521 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
146 Naoum v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (N.D. Ohio 
2004). 
147 Id. at 528. 
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Two important and notable exceptions to these three 
approaches to treaty-based challenges to deportation orders are 
two cases decided by Judge Weinstein.  In both Maria v. McElroy 
and Beharry v. Reno, Judge Weinstein held that the deportations 
at issue would violate the United States’ treaty obligations.148  In 
Maria v. McElroy, the Board of Immigration Appeals confirmed 
an immigration judge’s decision that petitioner Eddy J. Maria 
was deportable as an “aggravated felon,” and thus ineligible for 
discretionary relief from deportation.149  Maria was admitted to 
the United States as a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) in 
1985 when he was ten years old.150  He had lived continuously in 
the United States since his admission.151  His entire immediate 
family resided in the United States, which included his parents 
and six siblings.152  Both of his parents and two of his siblings 
were United States citizens and his remaining siblings were 
LPRs.  In 1996, Maria pled guilty to attempted unarmed robbery 
and was sentenced to two to four years.153  At the time that Maria 
committed his crime, a single conviction for attempted robbery 
with a sentence of two to four years would not have made him 
deportable.154  Around two months after Maria’s arrest and one 
month before his conviction, AEDPA was enacted.155  IIRIRA was 
enacted several months after Maria’s conviction.156  Post-AEDPA 
and IIRIRA, Maria’s robbery conviction made him deportable as 
an aggravated felon and thus ineligible for discretionary relief 
from deportation.157  
Judge Weinstein examined whether or not the retroactive 
application of IIRIRA’s aggravated felony definition violated 
Maria’s rights under the ICCPR.  The ICCPR protects an 
 
148 Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), overruled by Restrepo 
v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d and remanded by Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
149 Maria, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
150 Id. at 213. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 At that time, robbery was a deportable offense if one was sentenced to at 
least five years or one had a previous conviction for a crime involving moral 
turpitude. Maria had no previous criminal convictions. Id.  
155 Id. at 214. 
156 Id. 
157 The statutory definition of an aggravated felony for theft and burglary 
changed from requiring a sentence of five years to one year. Id. at 210. 
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individual from unlawful or arbitrary interference with one’s 
right to family life.  As such, a noncitizen cannot be deported if 
the deportation, “while in accordance with its domestic law, is 
nonetheless unreasonable and in conflict with the underlying 
provisions of the ICCPR.”158  Additionally, article 13 of the 
ICCPR requires that noncitizens facing deportation “be allowed 
to submit the reasons against his expulsion” unless doing so 
would threaten compelling national security interests.159  Maria 
was denied an opportunity to provide such reasons, including 
interference with family unity, because he was deportable as an 
aggravated felon and was ineligible for discretionary relief from 
deportation.160  Judge Weinstein concluded that denying Maria 
this opportunity violated the ICCPR.161   
Judge Weinstein addressed this issue again in Beharry v. 
Reno.  Don Beharry immigrated to the United States when he 
was seven years old from Trinidad.162  Beharry had resided in the 
United States continuously since his admission.163  His United 
States citizen mother and daughter and his LPR sister also 
resided in the United States.164  Beharry was convicted of second 
degree robbery for stealing $714 from a coffee shop and was 
sentenced to two-and-a-quarter to four-and-a-half years.165  He 
had previously been convicted of petty larceny, criminal mischief, 
and second degree riot; however, he was never incarcerated as a 
result of these convictions.166  Reviewing the ICCPR, the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and customary international law, 
Judge Weinstein concluded that the ICCPR required that 
Beharry have an opportunity “to present the reasons he should 
 
158 Id. at 232. 
159 Id.  
160 Section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
excluded individuals “deportable by reason of having committed any criminal offense 
covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 
241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by section 
241(a)(2)(A)(i)” from 212(c) relief. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277. 
161 Maria, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 234. Judge Weinstein also concluded that the 
retroactive application of section 440 of AEDPA violated customary international 
law. Id. 
162 See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
163 See id. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. at 586–87. 
166 See id. at 587. 
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not be deported.”167  Failing to provide this opportunity “violates 
the ICCPR’s guarantee against arbitrary interference with one’s 
family, and the provision that an alien shall ‘be allowed to submit 
the reasons against his expulsion.’ ”168  In interpreting the INA 
“in a way not inconsistent with international law,” Judge 
Weinstein concluded that Beharry was entitled to a 
compassionate hearing.169   
The Second Circuit abrogated Maria on other grounds and 
overruled Beharry on other grounds, but in 2005, the Second 
Circuit decided Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, which abrogated 
Beharry’s treaty-based holdings.170  As noted above, in Guaylupo-
Moya, the court concluded that pursuant to the last-in-time 
doctrine congressional intent regarding the availability of 
discretionary relief from deportation for aggravated felons was 
clear.  To the extent these rules violate the ICCPR, the 
immigration laws, which post-date ratification of the ICCPR, 
displace the conflicting treaty provisions.171   
Claims that treaties can provide an effective basis for 
restricting the State’s immigration power ignore two significant 
challenges.  The first is the Court’s historical reluctance to 
enforce U.S. treaty obligations in the face of conflicting or 
contradictory federal action.  The second is the status of the 
relevant treaties.  The Court has refused to enforce bilateral 
treaties explicitly granting individuals migration rights when 
Congress or the executive branch has taken subsequent action 
that limits or contradicts the treaty rights.172  Because 
immigration is still seen as a political matter, the Court seeks to 
maintain maximum flexibility in decisionmaking.  The relevant 
human rights treaties are either non-self-executing or have not 
been ratified.  The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 and 
signed the CRC in 1995 but has not ratified it.  The ICCPR is not 
 
167 Id. at 604. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. Such a hearing would also remedy potential violations of the UDHR’s 
prohibition against arbitrary exile and the requirement that all individuals are 
entitled to a full and fair hearing to determine rights and obligations. 
170 See Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004) (abrogating Maria’s 
retroactivity analysis in light of Domond v. INA, 244 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also 
Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court 
judgment due to petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies). 
171 See Guaylupo-Maya v. Gonzalez, 423 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2005). 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 93–112. 
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a self-executing treaty.173  As such it does not “automatically have 
effect as domestic law.”174  The Court’s decision to apply the last-
in-time doctrine to self-executing treaties like the Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation treaties, the Burlingame Treaty, and 
the 1880 Treaty suggests that judicial enforcement of the ICCPR 
would be limited. 
This does not suggest that human rights treaties are all 
together powerless in the United States.175  This Article has 
focused on the specific use of human rights treaties, such as the 
ICCPR, to bolster judicial review by U.S. courts of deportation 
decisions.176  The distinctive way in which immigration has been 
framed by U.S. courts presents a difficult challenge for human 
rights enforcement.  The framing of immigration as a foreign 
affairs matter catapults it into a special domain in which 
national sovereignty is implicated.  Courts are not only faced 
with treaty enforcement, which historically has been seen as a 
political issue, but also with a domestic issue that is seen to be 
inherently political.  This double dose of political decisionmaking 
in the immigration context makes judicial enforcement of human 
rights treaty obligations harder than it would be in other 
contexts. 
The problems discussed in this Part present formidable 
challenges to the use of human rights treaties to constrain the 
United States’ power to deport noncitizens.  However, the most 
significant hurdle could be addressed through the enactment of 
implementing legislation for the ICCPR.  Then the issue would 
become, what exactly does the ICCPR require and how can State 
parties comply?  Does the ICCPR only require a hearing in which 
 
173 The FCN treaties at issue in much of the treaty enforcement jurisprudence of 
the nineteenth century were considered self-executing treaties. See Medellín v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 518–21 (2008). As such, they could form the basis of a legal 
claim in a U.S. court. The Court never explicitly addressed whether or not the 
Burlingame Treaty or the 1880 Treaty were self-executing, but the Court’s opinions 
in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting treat these treaties as having domestic effect.   
174 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504, 505 n.2. 
175 For example, courts play an important role in enforcing treaty obligations by 
deciding cases brought pursuant to the Alien Torts Claims Act. Courts and 
administrative adjudicative bodies are similarly effective at monitoring U.S. 
compliance with the Refugee Convention and Protocol. 
176 I have chosen not to examine the effectiveness of using international forums 
to review U.S. deportation decisions for compliance with treaty obligations. This is 
primarily because the United States has not ratified the optional protocol that 
grants the Human Rights Committee jurisdiction to review claims of ICCPR 
violations. 
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deportable noncitizens have the opportunity to be heard as the 
courts in Naoum and Fernandez contend?177  Alternatively does it 
require that adjudicators conduct a proportionality analysis to 
determine whether or not the deportation order would violate the 
noncitizen’s article 17 rights as Judge Weinstein suggests?178  
Article 17 does not answer these questions; it provides a 
standard for State conduct.  The use of a standard—“[n]o one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
 . . . family”—gives decision makers a great deal of discretion to 
determine what constitutes arbitrary interference.179  The 
indeterminacy of particular human rights obligations presents 
the most significant hurdle to the use of human rights treaties to 
increase judicial monitoring of deportation decisions. 
III. TREATY INDETERMINACY 
The limits that the ICCPR imposes on a State’s power to 
deport noncitizens cannot be determined solely by the language 
of the treaty.  The ICCPR dictates standards that do not mandate 
a specific outcome.  Rather, the treaty articulates a combination 
of rules and standards that grant State parties and adjudicators 
varying degrees of discretion to determine what constitutes 
compliance.  This creates indeterminacy as to the required 
outcome in specific cases alleging treaty rights violations.  This 
Part begins by detailing the relationship between treaty 
indeterminacy and framing.  Through this relationship, this Part 
demonstrates the limited role that human rights treaties can 
play in increasing the U.S. judiciary’s role in monitoring 
deportation decisions. 
It is commonly understood that a mix of rules and standards 
are used to protect individual rights pursuant to domestic 
constitutions and that domestic constitutions are often 
indeterminate.  Yet human rights activists and scholars rarely 
acknowledge the indeterminacy of human rights treaties when 
seeking greater domestic judicial enforcement of treaty 
 
177 Naoum v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, 528 (N.D. Ohio 
2004); Fernandez v. INS, No. 03-CV-2623, 2004 WL 951491, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 
2004). 
178 See Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also 
Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 604 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
179 ICCPR, supra note 134, art. 17. 
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obligations.180  The assumption is that if judges took a more 
active role in reviewing human rights treaty-based claims, 
specific outcomes would be achieved.181  Rather than 
acknowledging this issue, human rights advocates and treaty 
body members often portray State parties advocating alternative 
approaches to interpreting and applying treaty obligations as 
defending noncompliance rather than offering legitimate 
alternatives.  There is a tendency to forget that the combined use 
of rules, standards, and principles to articulate individual rights 
creates indeterminacy.182  This indeterminacy creates space in 
which a variety of outcomes are possible.  The use of different 
frames by decision makers to analyze allegations of rights 
violations illustrates how States can legitimately reach a variety 
of outcomes.  Increased judicial enforcement of human rights 
treaty obligations would therefore not necessarily lead to the 
same outcomes reached by treaty bodies.   
International law, like all areas of law, is subject to a certain 
level of indeterminacy.183  The desire for universalism requires 
structuring human rights obligations in a way that 
accommodates a variety of national legal practices and 
 
180 See generally Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A 
Policy Analysis of Litigating International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139 (2006); Kadidal, supra note 11; Lori A. Nessel, 
Families at Risk: How Errant Enforcement and Restrictionist Integration Policies 
Threaten the Immigrant Family in the European Union and the United States, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1271 (2008); Roth, supra note 11. 
181 This position fails to acknowledge the extent to which law and judicial 
decisionmaking reflects rather than sets a society’s normative commitments. Absent 
recognition that security of residence for noncitizens does not inevitably implicate 
foreign affairs or national security, U.S. courts will continue to apply standards in a 
manner that maintains maximum flexibility for the government.   
182 See Karl Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction, 25 U. BRIT. 
COLUM. L. REV. 69, 99–100 (1991). It is not my contention that human rights 
treaties are so indeterminate as to be useless. Rather, my position is that law as an 
institution provides certain constraints on legal decision makers but that treaties by 
themselves do not provide clear directives regarding outcomes. See infra text 
accompanying notes 186–88. 
183 Referencing H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, Koskenniemi notes that “[i]n 
every legal system a large and important field is left open for the exercise of 
discretion by Courts and other officials rendering initially vague standards 
determinate, in resolving the incertainites of statutes, or in developing and 
qualifying rules only broadly communicated by the authoritative standards.” MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 36 (2005) (quoting H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 136 
(Clarendon Press 1994) (1961)). 
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traditions.184  The use of standards and evaluative terminology 
assists in achieving this goal.185  Commitment to universal 
application recognizes that States will operationalize and 
implement treaty obligations in a variety of ways despite 
acceptance of a broad set of legal rules and principles.186  The 
options available to States, however, are limited.  Law as an 
institution provides its own internal constraints on decision 
makers.187  These constraints prevent human rights treaties from 
becoming meaningless because of the indeterminacy.  The 
indeterminacy here is relative rather than extreme.188   
Human rights treaties create a variety of obligations for 
State parties.  Professors Steiner, Alston, and Goodman identify 
five categories of obligations: (1) to respect the rights of others; 
(2) to create institutional machinery essential to the realization 
of rights; (3) to protect rights and prevent violations; (4) to 
provide goods and services to satisfy rights; and (5) to promote 
rights.189  Challenges to deportation decisions implicate a State’s 
third obligation to protect rights and prevent violations.  Yet the 
articulation of rights can take the form of bright-line rules or 
flexible standards.190  Articles 7 and 17 of the ICCPR illustrate 
this distinction.  Article 7 of the ICCPR states that “No one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
 
184 See, e.g., Klare, supra note 182, at 99. 
185 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 39 n.72 (citing Wrongful Imprisonment for 
Fraud Case, 72 I.L.R. 1987 (1971)); Klare, supra note 182, at 99–102. 
186 STEINER, ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 366–68. 
187 The development of case law by treaty bodies is one way in which legal 
institutions provide internal constraints on State decision makers. 
188 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 590–96. Indeterminacy can be beneficial, 
but it gives rise to a certain level of uncertainty regarding what constitutes 
compliance with a specific legal obligation. On the one hand, the indeterminacy of 
article 17 of the ICCPR creates space for judges like Judge Weinstein to conclude 
that deportation proceedings must include individualized proportionality reviews. 
See infra text accompanying notes 148–69. Yet it also allows for a narrower reading 
of article 17 in which the deportation of certain categories of noncitizens is ex ante 
deemed proportionate. Neither the text of article 17 nor the Human Rights 
Committee jurisprudence dictates which approach is required. See KOSKENNIEMI, 
supra note 183, at 590–96. 
189 STEINER, ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 187–90. Elsewhere, I have 
referred to these treaty obligations and commitments as falling into three categories: 
structural, programmatic, and legal. Angela M. Banks, CEDAW, Compliance, and 
Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in Sub-Saharan Africa, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
781, 807 (2009). 
190 See, e.g., KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 37; Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–59 (1992). 
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treatment or punishment,” and article 17 of the ICCPR states, 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation.”191  Article 7 establishes a 
bright-line rule about a State’s ability to torture individuals; such 
behavior is absolutely prohibited.  State parties and adjudicators 
have little discretion when torture is involved.192  Article 17 does 
not create a bright-line rule regarding State interference with 
family life—it does not prohibit all such interferences.  Rather, 
article 17 only prohibits arbitrary and unlawful interferences.  
The use of evaluative terminology grants State parties and 
adjudicators discretion in determining whether or not the State 
has violated an individual’s article 17 rights.193  Determining 
what constitutes arbitrary interference requires taking account 
of a variety of factors.  Frames play an important role in 
determining how those factors will be evaluated.194  Human 
rights obligations like article 17 do not dictate how States should 
balance a noncitizens’ right to family life and a State’s interest in 
deporting a noncitizen.  The different approaches taken by the 
Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) and U.S. federal courts to 
substantive challenges to deportation decisions reflect the role of 
background norms, legal tradition, and governance structure in 
determining how legal rules and standards will be applied in 
specific categories of cases.  While State practice and treaty body 
jurisprudence may coalesce around more concrete interpretations 
of treaty obligations like article 17 over the long-term, for the 
short- to medium-term, we have significant divergence.  This 
divergence makes it difficult for courts to use the ICCPR to 
definitively increase their monitoring of deportation decisions. 
 
191 ICCPR, supra note 134, arts. 7, 17. 
192 This does not, however, prevent States from contending that certain 
“interrogation techniques” do not constitute torture. See Memorandum from John 
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President 
(Aug. 1, 2002) (contending that the interrogation techniques being used to 
“capture[ ] al Qaeda operatives” do not constitute torture).  
193 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 39. 
194 The bar against unlawful interference also raises a few questions. For 
example, is unlawful interference limited to interference that would violate domestic 
law or does it include interference that is not explicitly authorized by law? The 
discretion that adjudicators must exercise in answering these questions is narrower 
than the discretion exercised when determining what constitutes arbitrary 
interference.  
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The debate within the United States about the State’s power 
to deport noncitizens centers on the role of the judiciary in 
monitoring and checking political actors.  Article 17 provides a 
potential substantive check on the State’s power to deport 
noncitizens, but it does not stipulate who should enforce that 
check or the scope of the check.  Article 17 does not mandate 
robust judicial review for allegations of article 17 violations, nor 
does it demand proportionality review to determine 
arbitrariness.  Pursuant to the discretion provided by article 17, 
the HRC has concluded that domestic administrative or judicial 
adjudicators should review deportation decisions for 
proportionality.195  This same discretion could support the U.S. 
approach of judicial deference to political actors.  Current U.S. 
law provides a mechanism for political officials—immigration 
judges and the BIA—to consider family unity in a limited set of 
circumstances.196  This could plausibly reflect the instances in 
which deportation would constitute an arbitrary interference 
with family life.   
The arbitrariness standard in article 17 grants decision 
makers more discretion than bright-line rules like article 7’s 
absolute prohibition against torture.  The availability of this  
 
 
 
195 The same is true for the European Court of Human Rights, which has 
evaluated similar claims pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”). Article 8 of the ECHR states that  
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
Discretion is afforded to the State parties and adjudicators based on the standard 
that interferences with the right to family life must be “necessary in a democratic 
society” to promote specific state interests. 
196 Immigration judges and the BIA are authorized to cancel the removal of 
noncitizens when their removal will be in the best interests of the United States or 
constitute an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the noncitizen’s U.S. 
citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006 & Supp. II); In re 
C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) (quoting Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 
581, 584–85 (BIA 1978)). 
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discretion creates a context in which frames play an important 
role in determining what factors will be considered in the 
arbitrariness analysis and how the factors will be evaluated.  
Frames are thought organizers and they “call our attention 
to certain events and their underlying causes and consequences 
and direct our attention away from others.”197  Lawyers utilize 
frames as a key component of legal argument.  Legal issues can 
be presented in a variety of ways.  For example, a State’s failure 
to criminalize female genital cutting can be presented as State 
protection and respect for freedom of religion or as endangering 
the health and welfare of minor girls.  These alternative 
approaches to defining the legal issue significantly impact the 
decisions courts make regarding the applicable legal rules, 
relevant precedent, and standards of review.  Good legal 
advocacy requires defining the legal issues as advantageously as 
possible.  But it is the adjudicator who will ultimately define the 
issues presented and he or she will utilize frames in making that 
decision.  While the advocacy skills of the lawyers will play a role 
in how the issue is presented, other factors play a role.  Some 
frames will be more useful than others, because they resonate 
with existing norms and values and thus appear natural and 
familiar.198  Human rights treaties do not dictate what frames a 
State party must or should use when evaluating a social or legal 
issue.  This is left to the parties to the dispute and the relevant 
decision makers.  Yet these frames play a key role in influencing 
what questions are asked and how they are answered.  Different 
social histories, approaches to judicial review, and governance 
systems cause different frames to dominate in different States.199  
Thus, the usefulness of foreign jurisprudence can vary greatly.  
The same is true for the jurisprudence of treaty bodies. 
U.S. courts rely heavily on a national sovereignty frame 
while European adjudicative bodies utilize a public order frame.  
 
197 MYRA MAX FERREE ET AL., SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE: DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 14 (2002); see also Banks, 
supra note 189, at 792–93. Additionally, frames “organize and make coherent an 
apparently diverse array of symbols, images, and arguments, linking them through 
an underlying organizing idea that suggests what is at stake on the issue.” Id. 
198 FERREE ET AL., supra note 197, at 70; see also Banks, supra note 189, at 793–
94. 
199 A State’s governance system refers to the various ways in which States 
allocate power and authority to different governance institutions and the 
relationships between these different institutions in their ability to check and 
balance each other.  
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The names for these frames reflect not only the fundamental 
question asked within each frame but also the source of the 
immigration power in these States.  In U.S. deportation 
jurisprudence, the fundamental question examined is how to 
protect the United States national interests domestically and 
internationally.  In European States the key question is how to 
balance the rights of the noncitizen with the State’s duty protect 
the health and safety of its residents.200  Both frames are 
concerned with protecting national interests, but European 
courts focus on a narrower set of national interests, while U.S. 
courts consider the broadest possible range of national interests.  
The use of a national sovereignty frame by U.S. courts suggests 
that any article 17 analysis would grant significant deference to 
political decision makers.  Such deference in determining 
arbitrariness may mirror the facially legitimate and bona fide 
reason review applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel201 and Fiallo v. 
Bell.202  In each of these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to 
determine whether the government had a legitimate and bona 
fide reason for its immigration decision.203  The arbitrariness 
standard articulated in article 17 does not preclude or mandate 
either of these approaches.  It empowers decision makers to 
determine what factors should be considered and how those 
factors should be evaluated to determine arbitrary interference 
with family life.  The HRC’s use of proportionality review reflects 
specific conclusions regarding the basis for the State’s power to 
deport noncitizens, which government institutions are authorized 
 
200 These bodies rely on proportionality review to determine the appropriate 
balance between State interests and individual rights. The individual’s right to 
family life is evaluated by examining family and social ties to the individual’s State 
of residence and their State of nationality. Relevant factors for this analysis include 
length of residence, location of family members, relationship with family members, 
language skills, and employment history. See generally Angela M. Banks, Deporting 
Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?, 27 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 489 (2010). 
The State’s interest in protecting public safety is measured by the seriousness of the 
criminal activity giving rise to deportation. The vast majority of the deportation 
cases challenged before the HRC and the ECtHR involve deportation orders based 
on criminal convictions. Id.  
201 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
202 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
203 Both of these cases dealt with admissions decisions that were challenged as 
violating the rights of U.S. citizens. Whether the Court would apply even this 
minimal level of judicial review to deportation challenges raised by noncitizens is a 
bit of an open question. However, these cases articulate the highest standard of 
review provided by the Court to substantive challenges to immigration decisions. 
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to exercise that power, and the role of courts and administrative 
bodies in reviewing uses of that power.  United States courts 
have reached different conclusions on each of these points, and 
calls for greater judicial enforcement of the ICCPR will not 
necessarily bring about HRC-style proportionality review.204   
Noncitizens facing deportation in the United States, Europe, 
Australia, and Canada have challenged their deportation orders 
as violations of their right to family unity.  All of these States 
have domestic laws that protect an individual’s right to family 
life, yet this right as with many other domestic rights is not 
absolute.  Neither domestic law nor international law absolutely 
prohibits State interference with family life—certain 
interferences are permitted.  Standards, rather than bright-line 
rules, are used to police the boundary between permitted and 
prohibited interferences.  For example, as noted above, the 
ICCPR only prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interferences with 
family life.205  Within the United States, the constitutional right 
to family privacy protects against undue State interference.206  
Despite legal recognition of an individual’s right to family life, 
adjudicators around the world have reached different conclusions 
about the judiciary’s role in reviewing immigration decisions that 
interfere with family life.  Federal courts in the United States 
defer to the decisions of the political actors while European 
courts actively monitor and evaluate the political actors’ 
immigration decisions.   
 
 
204 See Banks, supra note 200. 
205 ICCPR, supra note 134, art. 17. 
206 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that there is “a 
private realm of family life which the State cannot enter”); see also David D. Meyer, 
The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 547–48 (2000); Lois A. 
Weithorn, Can a Subsequent Change in Law Void a Marriage That Was Valid at Its 
Inception? Considering the Legal Effect of Proposition 8 on California’s Existing 
Same-Sex Marriages, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1119–20 (2009). What constitutes 
undue state interference is a matter of some controversy. While the Court’s 
jurisprudence discusses family privacy as a fundamental right, the standards of 
review used by the Court have been something other than strict scrutiny. See Meyer, 
supra, at 539–48. Meyer argues that the actual review provided by the Court 
examines state interference with family privacy for reasonableness rather than 
seeking to ensure that the interference is based on a compelling state interest that is 
narrowly tailored to address that interest. Id. 
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The deferential stance of U.S. courts is due in part to the 
courts’ conclusions regarding institutional competences.207  The 
discussion in Part I detailing the relationship between treaties 
and immigration helps to explain why the Court views 
immigration decisions as political decisions implicating national 
sovereignty.  As long as immigration is viewed this way there is a 
“lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving” challenges to immigration decisions, or, alternatively, 
it is impossible to resolve the challenge without making an initial 
policy decision that is “clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”208  
European courts did not face similar institutional competence 
concerns because they did not view immigration laws and 
regulations as distinct from other forms of domestic legislation.  
States regulated migration pursuant to their authority to 
maintain public order, which empowers public authorities to act 
to protect public welfare, peace, and security.209  Judicial review 
of government decisions regarding public order did not 
necessitate judicial deference or self-restraint.  As public order 
decisions, the political branches of government are not uniquely 
qualified or exclusively empowered to make immigration 
decisions.  Consequently, courts throughout Europe perform their 
traditional review functions when faced with challenges to 
immigration decisions.210  For example, in Germany, migrant 
workers challenged family reunification restrictions as a 
violation of article 6 of Germany’s Basic Law, which protects 
family life.211  The Basic Law does not distinguish between 
 
207 Foreign affairs and national security are matters that the Constitution has 
committed to other branches of government. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
This creates a separation of powers concern that is amplified by the political nature 
of foreign affairs and national security.   
208 Id. at 217. 
209 See, e.g., Roger Warren Evans, French and German Administrative Law with 
Some English Comparisons, 14 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1104, 1116 (1965). Despite the 
use of bilateral treaties and multinational agreements to facilitate labor migration, 
European courts did not view immigration regulation as a foreign affairs matter. 
STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION: INTERNATIONAL 
POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 101–02 (2009). See Banks, supra 
note 200, for further discussion of the frame choices made by U.S. and European 
courts. 
210 See Banks, supra note 200.  
211 Tugrul Ansay, The New UN Convention in Light of the German and Turkish 
Experience, 25 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 831, 836–37 (1991) [hereinafter Ansay, The 
New UN Convention]; Tugrul Ansay, Legal Problems of Migrant Workers, in 156 
RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF  
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citizens and noncitizens and the German courts’ analysis of the 
family reunification claims did not differ from its analysis of 
other article 6 challenges.212   
Increased judicial enforcement of the ICCPR in the United 
States is unlikely to lead to the use of proportionality review in 
cases challenging deportation decisions.  The United States has 
the legal infrastructure available to reach the same outcomes as 
the ECtHR or the HRC when deportation decisions are 
challenged as violating rights to family life.213  Our legal system 
recognizes family privacy, which provides analogous protection 
as article 17 of the ICCPR and article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  Neither the domestic nor the 
international legal protection of family life is absolute.  States 
are permitted to interfere with family life under certain 
conditions, which creates a degree of indeterminacy as to which 
interferences are permissible.  The relevant legal standards 
require adjudicators to exercise discretion in determining what 
factors will be considered and how such factors will be evaluated.  
The frames utilized by the adjudicators play an important role in 
shaping how this discretion is exercised.  The use of a national 
sovereignty frame in the United States guides U.S. judges to 
emphasize the political nature of deportation decisions, which 
has specific implications for the scope of judicial review.  This 
emphasis would not change if claims were based on article 17 of 
the ICCPR rather than the constitutional right to family privacy.   
Framing helps us understand divergent approaches to 
addressing allegations of human rights abuses.  The insights 
gained from viewing divergent outcomes as a result of framing 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 24 (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1980) (1977) [hereinafter Ansay, 
Hague Lectures]. National courts in France and Germany limited the State’s ability 
to restrict or limit family based migration. Virginie Guirdudon, European Courts 
and Foreigners’ Rights: A Comparative Study of Norms Diffusion, 34 INT’L 
MIGRATION REV. 1088, 1100 (2000). For example, in 1978 the French Conseil d’État 
struck down a suspension of family reunification for noncitizens because it was 
contrary to the general legal principle protecting an individual’s right to family life. 
Id. Similarly, in 1983 the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany prohibited 
Bavaria and Baden-Wurtenberg from creating a three-year waiting period for the 
admission of noncitizen spouses. The court considered this measure a violation of 
Article 6 of the Basic Law, which protects family life. Id.; see also CASTLES & 
MILLER, supra note 209, at 108. 
212 Ansay, The New UN Convention, supra note 211; Ansay, Hague Lectures, 
supra note 211; Guirdudon, supra note 211, at 1100. 
213 See Banks, supra note 200. 
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choices rather than as defiant noncompliance create 
opportunities for developing effective compliance strategies.  For 
example, the use of different frames to analyze female genital 
cutting (“FGC”) has had a significant impact on the way States 
approach regulating the practice.  In Egypt, when a religious 
freedom frame was used to analyze FGC, the State was hesitant 
to regulate for fear of impermissibly infringing upon individuals’ 
right to religious freedom.  Once a public health frame was 
utilized, the State had greater flexibility and legal tools available 
to regulate FGC and enforce those regulations.214  Similar 
framing decisions affected the quality of public participation in 
the drafting of Rwanda’s 2003 constitution.215  Rwanda used a 
participatory constitution-making process that lead to the 
adoption of a constitution that enjoys significant public support.  
The constitution facilitated women’s participation in the national 
legislature but discouraged multi-party democracy.216  Gender 
equity advocates and multi-party democracy advocates 
participated in the constitution-making process, yet only the 
former achieved internal inclusion in the process.217  Prior to the 
adoption of the 2003 constitution, women had not played a 
significant role in Rwandan politics.  Traditional cultural norms 
did not support women’s active political participation as elected 
officials.218  Despite these background norms, gender equity 
advocates were able to persuade key decision makers to utilize a 
peace and unity frame when analyzing public participation.219  
Due to other background norms, women were viewed as 
conciliatory members of society whose skills and social 
experience would be invaluable for creating a unified Rwanda.  
This perception of women supported increased political 
participation.220  As a result of Rwanda’s history with ethnic 
political parties, multi-party democracy was seen as a threat to 
 
214 See Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 405 (2007). 
215 See Angela M. Banks, Challenging Political Boundaries in Post-Conflict 
States, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 105, 106–07 (2007). 
216 Id. at 106, 157. 
217 Id. at 128–30, 145–61 (“Internal exclusion exists when ‘people lack effective 
opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to the 
fora and procedures of decision-making.’ ” (quoting IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION 
AND DEMOCRACY 55 (2000)) (emphasis added)). 
218 Id. at 149–50. 
219 Id. at 156–57. 
220 Id.  
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peace, unity, and reconciliation.221  Despite claims by both groups 
for greater political participation, the use of a peace and unity 
frame privileged women’s participation and disadvantaged multi-
party participation.  In both Rwanda and Egypt, framing 
decisions have played an important role in shaping human rights 
outcomes precisely because human rights treaties are 
indeterminate.   
Human rights scholars and activists who seek greater 
domestic judicial treaty enforcement tend to focus on the 
outcomes of foreign or treaty body jurisprudence.  Less attention 
is given to the role that social history, approaches to judicial 
review, or the State’s governance system have played in these 
adjudicative bodies’ legal analysis.  While human rights treaties 
attempt to reflect universal principles and legal rules, the 
application of such rules in specific cases must take account of 
unique social histories, approaches to judicial review, and 
governance systems.222  To achieve lasting change within a 
society, courts must root human rights-enforcing decisions within 
the legal and social norms of the society.  Importing outcomes 
without domestically based legal analysis is a shortcut.  The 
deportation jurisprudence of the HRC and ECtHR offers the 
United States an alternative way to think about the relationship 
between noncitizens and the State.  Current U.S. law provides 
the tools for enabling the judiciary to play a more active role in 
reviewing substantive challenges to deportation decisions.223  Yet 
these tools cannot be utilized to achieve this outcome until judges 
begin to use different frames when analyzing immigration  
 
 
221 Id. at 157. 
222 A State’s decision to ratify a treaty indicates its willingness to adhere to the 
provisions of the treaty. The fact that as of February 2009, eighty-five percent of the 
United Nations Member States had ratified the ICCPR suggests that these treaties 
reflect a degree of universality. But see MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE (2002) (questioning the universality of the 
existing human rights canon due to the lack of participation by a significant number 
of the current United Nations members); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To 
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 
621, 651 (2004) (discussing isomorphism as an explanation for treaty ratification 
and domestic legal reform despite lack of compliance); Hathaway, supra note 11 
(focusing on legal enforcement and collateral consequences to explain treaty 
ratification and compliance rather than universal norms). 
223 See Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651 
(2009). 
CP_Banks (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:10 PM 
2010] THE TROUBLE WITH TREATIES 1269 
matters.  As long as immigration is seen primarily as a national 
sovereignty matter, judicial self-restraint will persist due to 
separation of powers concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
When noncitizens like Mary Anne Gehris raise substantive 
challenges to deportation decisions in the United States, their 
claims receive scant judicial review.  Despite the initial appeal of 
using human rights treaties to increase the judicial monitoring 
role, this Article calls the viability of this strategy into question.  
The very doctrines that would allow U.S. courts to review ICCPR 
claims are the doctrines that would require judicial deference to 
the political actors.  Even if our courts were willing to adjudicate 
ICCPR claims, the judiciary’s use of a national sovereignty frame 
combined with the indeterminacy of the relevant treaty 
obligations would permit continued judicial deference. 
Treaties were the primary tool used to regulate immigration 
in the United States from the beginning of the republic through 
the mid-nineteenth century.  Through friendship, navigation, and 
commerce treaties, the United States determined which 
noncitizens could enter and reside within the country.  During 
this time period, the Court was developing a treaty enforcement 
jurisprudence in which the Court exercised robust review of 
allegations that state action violated a U.S. treaty obligation but 
was extremely deferential when the allegations were directed 
toward the federal government.  Part I of this Article 
demonstrates that these treaty enforcement doctrines informed 
the development of the plenary power doctrine and are unlikely 
to restrict its force.  Closely scrutinizing treaty-based challenges 
to immigration decisions would have undermined the Court’s 
efforts to ensure maximum flexibility for the federal government 
in conducting foreign affairs.  The plenary power doctrine 
enabled the Court to maintain such flexibility when faced with 
constitutional claims.  Based on this re-conceptualization of the 
relationship between treaty enforcement principles and the 
plenary power doctrine, Part II illustrates two significant 
challenges to using human rights treaties to increase judicial 
monitoring of deportation decisions.  The first challenge is the 
status of the relevant treaties, and the second is the historical 
reluctance of U.S. courts to enforce treaty obligations vis-à-vis 
the federal government.  Human rights treaties like the ICCPR 
CP_Banks (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:10 PM 
1270 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1219   
are non-self-executing treaties, and U.S. courts have declined to 
recognize such treaties as having domestic force.  When courts 
are willing to assume binding force for the sake of argument in 
immigration cases, they generally conclude that the last-in-time 
doctrine prevails.  U.S. ratification of the ICCPR in 1992 pre-
dates the most recent significant immigration reforms in 1996.  
While these problems could be addressed by enacting 
implementing legislation, a more fundamental problem exists 
due to the indeterminacy of the human rights obligations.  The 
ICCPR does not dictate what constitutes arbitrary interference 
with family life or prescribe a specific role for domestic 
judiciaries.  Rather, the use of a standard to protect family life 
grants decision makers a significant degree of discretion in 
determining what is and is not an arbitrary interference.  Part 
III contends that the manner in which this discretion is exercised 
is determined by the frames used by decision makers to analyze 
the legal issues presented.   
Despite changes in the legal tools used to regulate 
immigration, concerns about social cohesion, national identity, 
and loyalty continue to shape the U.S. judiciary’s approach to 
immigration issues.  The dominance of a national sovereignty 
frame diminishes the effectiveness of treaties like the ICCPR in 
limiting the scope of the United States’ power to deport 
noncitizens.  The failure of U.S. courts to exercise robust judicial 
review of immigration laws, regulations, and decisions is not due 
to a lack of existing law protecting family unity or the 
nonexistence of proportionality principles.  Rather, it is due to 
the Court’s desire to maintain maximum flexibility for 
international political decisionmaking.  The Court’s dedication to 
this goal is attributable to two factors: its pre-existing treaty 
enforcement doctrines and its use of a national sovereignty frame 
to analyze immigration issues. 
The jurisprudence of treaty bodies like the HRC reaches the 
desired outcome for many of us concerned about the current state 
of the United States’ deportation jurisprudence.  Yet as long as 
there continues to be different understandings of a State’s 
experience with immigration, approach to judicial review, and 
allocation of immigration authority, U.S. judicial enforcement of 
human rights treaties will not achieve the same outcomes as the 
treaty body deportation jurisprudence.  Over-estimating the 
influence of treaty jurisprudence limits the ability of legal 
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scholars and practitioners to develop alternative strategies for 
enforcing human rights obligations.  In the immigration context, 
more attention needs to be given to administrative treaty 
enforcement strategies in addition to non-legal strategies that 
can broaden our nation’s perception of immigration beyond 
national sovereignty.   
 
